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ABSTRACT 
Conflicts of interest permeate the governance of the federal advisory 
committees that issue recommendations to consumer protection agencies, 
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and therefore, American consumers need 
a federal solution to protect their health from biased recommendations. In 
order to promote a business-friendly food pyramid, agribusinesses and food 
industrialists lobby for dietary guidelines that boost their sales. The resulting 
guidelines cause great damage to public health, spur environmental 
pollution, and result in a loss of democratic freedoms. As a result, the FDA 
and USDA's bifurcated task of protecting both food producers and 
consumers, creates a conflict of interest within the agencies that often favor 
the food industry over consumer protection. 
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This paper describes the problems embedded within the FDA and 
USDA's conflict of interest and the resulting revolving door of the heavily 
invested lobbyists, and finally, suggests statutory amendments to solve this 
problem. The proposed amendments will dispense with ineffective disclosure 
requirements and eliminate the possibility of waiving conflicts of interest for 
advisory committee members. By rebalancing the composition of the advisory 
committees and the scientific basis for the dietary recommendations, the 
proposed amendments will close the loopholes that large food industrialists 
currently abuse. As a result, consumer protection agencies, such as the FDA 
and USDA, are empowered to police the federal advisory committees issuing 
the dietary recommendations and prevent government officials from 
breaching their fiduciary duties to American consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
WHAT IS A CONFLICT? 
Conflicts of interest permeate the governance of the federal advisory 
committees that issue recommendations to consumer protection agencies, 
and, therefore, American consumers need a federal solution to protect their 
health from biased recommendations. The foremost public duty of federal 
consumer protection agencies is to protect consumers.1 Therefore, in the case 
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), protecting public health should be a 
priority. 
Agribusinesses, fast food producers, and snack food industrialists, "Big 
Food," should follow the principle "Primum Non Nocere (First, Do No 
Harm)"2  because they "are ethically obligated to do no harm to their 
consumers, and are expected to manufacture high quality products that adhere 
to certain health and safety standards."3 Instead, the FDA and USDA should 
                                                        
1 The Congressional Statement of Purpose under Title 7 of the United 
States Code provides: 
[T]he purposes of this chapter [on Agriculture] are to . . . 
(6) establish mechanisms for addressing the nutrition 
monitoring needs of Federal, State, and local governments, the 
private sector, scientific and engineering communities, health 
care professionals, and the public in support of the foregoing 
purposes; and 
(7) provide for the conduct of such scientific research and 
development as may be necessary or appropriate in support of 
such purposes. 
7 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012) (emphasis added). 
2 Haitham M. Ahmed, Obesity, Fast Food Manufacture, and Regulation: 
Revisiting Opportunities for Reform, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565, 567 (2009). 
3 Id. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 6 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
control the consumption of the amount and quality of fast food and snack 
foods in order to protect consumer health.4 However, this paper shows that 
the FDA and USDA fail to protect consumers from the diseases associated 
with excessive snack and fast food consumption. Instead, Big Food's "food 
governmentenomics" 5  strategies seize control over government protection 
agencies without regard for public health consequences. Agribusinesses and 
food industrialists lobby for dietary guidelines to boost sales rather than 
protect consumers. The resulting guidelines cause great damage to public 
health, environmental pollution, and loss of democratic freedoms. As a result, 
the FDA and USDA's bifurcated tasks create a conflict of interest within the 
agencies that often favor the food industry over consumer protection. 
In fact, the FDA and USDA try to balance seemingly irreconcilable 
responsibilities: promoting agribusinesses and food production while 
protecting consumers from abuse by the same. Because the food industry's 
profit margins are achieved by the promotion of unhealthy and dangerous 
snack and fast foods, the health of millions of Americans is compromised by 
"smart" business decisions. Thus, there is "undue influence of food 
companies not only on the health of the public but also on democratic 
                                                        
4  See Jeff Herman, Saving U.S. Dietary Advice from Conflicts of 
Interest, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 294 (2010). The author explains that the 
main functions of the USDA are to "1) ensure a safe food supply; 2) promote 
the agricultural industry; and 3) give dietary advice." Id. He adds that "[e]arly 
on, the second and third seemed consistent with each other: millions of 
Americans died each year from malnutrition, and it was believed that 
increasing consumption of agricultural products was the appropriate 
solution." Id. However, this no longer holds true. Id. 
5  See infra Part I.C. Food Governmentenomics is a concept that 
describes the economic and public health effects resulting from agribusiness 
and food lobby influences on government agencies, such as the FDA and 
USDA, and federal advisory committees to change their priorities of interest 
from private industry to consumer protection. 
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political processes and institutions."6 This "undue influence" is commonly 
called a "conflict of interest," and is defined as "[a] real or seeming 
incompatibility between one's private interests and one's public or fiduciary 
duties."7 Therefore, the FDA and USDA's public duties to protect consumers 
and public health clashes with their fiduciary duties to promote American 
agriculture and, implicitly, Big Food's business.8 Such distortions in consumer 
protection are possible because loopholes permeate the laws governing the 
dietary guidelines. The statutory amendments to 7 U.S.C. § 5341, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 208 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act suggested in this article may 
close these loopholes if enacted, and the dietary guidelines may be rebalanced 
to protect consumers and to promote public health. 
In order to close those loopholes, I first propose that the legislature 
revise the composition of federal advisory committees that issue dietary 
recommendations to the FDA and USDA for the dietary guidelines. Second, I 
suggest how Congress may rebalance the scientific research basis for these 
guidelines through statutory requirements, in order to prevent Big Food from 
unduly influencing the interpretation and use of scientific data. Third, I 
explain why the mere disclosure of potential conflicts of interest for advisory 
committee member nominees is not enough to ensure that they do not issue 
guidelines that benefit the private industry at the cost of public health. 
Specifically, instead of only requiring disclosure of industry ties, I propose 
                                                        
6  See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 91–115 (revised and expanded ed. 
2007). See also WILLIAM HARRIS, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF VEGETARIANISM 
(1995). 
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 319 (8th ed. 2004). 
8  Kelly D. Brownell & Kenneth E. Warner, The Perils of Ignoring 
History Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big 
Food?, 87 THE MILBANK Q. 259, 276 (2009) ("While working to promote 
healthy eating, the USDA at the same time has as its main objective the 
promotion of American agriculture (selling more food), so one goal typically 
prevails over the other when the two conflict."). 
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that the legislature should preclude committee members and nominees from 
waiving conflicts of interest. Therefore, my amendment establishes that all 
nominees and committee members have to rebut the presumption that they 
have a conflict of interest result from industry ties. 
Statutory amendments could solve some of the problems embedded 
within the FDA and USDA's conflict of interest and are outlined hereinafter. 
Part I functions as a description and analysis of the problems associated with 
the FDA and USDA's conflict of interest practices. It discusses the negative 
effects of the food and beverage industry lobby on the consumer protection 
agencies, and outlines Big Food's strategy to lobby for favorable policies and 
dietary guidelines. A part of this discussion will focus on how the conflict of 
interest affects the FDA and USDA advisory committees. Part II will show 
how the dietary guidelines for Americans implement the conflicts of interest,9 
and what the detrimental consequences of these recommendations are for 
public health, the environment, and democracy as a whole. Part III will 
provide suggestions for legislative action to stop Big Food from abusing the 
conflict-of-interest loopholes and show how similar approaches have yielded 
promising results in other countries. 
I. THE PROBLEM: THE FDA AND USDA CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
A. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
1. THE FOOD AND BEVERAGE LOBBY 
The food and beverage lobby invests large amounts of money into 
shaping laws that are favorable to their businesses. Professor Marion Nestle,10 
                                                        
9  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012), for recommendations on which the 
USDA and FDA base dietary guidelines. See 7 U.S.C. § 5341 (2012), for the 
dietary guidelines the USDA issues for American every five years. 
10 Marion Nestle is Paulette Goddard Professor in the Department of 
Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health and Professor of Sociology at 
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one of the foremost analysts of food politics, explains that food companies 
"lobby Congress for favorable laws, government agencies for favorable 
regulations, and the White House for favorable trade agreements."11 
Lobbying, according to Nestle, "is a huge industry unto itself."12 The Center 
for Responsive Politics reported that the total investment by the food and 
beverage industry in 2009 alone amounted to $57,616,216.13 This enormous 
influx of what can be seen as legal bribery came from 71 reported companies 
and was disseminated by 348 reported lobbyists.14 In 2010, the numbers were 
greatly reduced, and in 2011 the numbers were only half of those reported in 
2009.15 However, this decrease in financial contributions from the lobbyists, 
                                                                                                                              
New York University. She holds a Ph.D. in molecular biology and an M.P.H. 
in public health nutrition. As former member of the FDA Food Advisory 
Committee and Science Board, the USDA/DHHS Dietary Guidelines 
Advisory Committee, and American Cancer Society committees that issue 
dietary guidelines for cancer prevention, she has gained significant insight in 
the issues she continues to research and write about. According to her own 
website description, her research focuses on how science and society 
influence dietary advice and practice. She has published several bestselling 
and important books on food politics and food safety issues and she 
showcases her works at http://www.foodpolitics.com. See Marion Nestle, 
About Marion Nestle, FOOD POLITICS, http://www.foodpolitics.com/about/. 
11 NESTLE, supra note 6, at 93. 
12 Id. at 97. 
13  Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2009, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id 
=n01&year=2010; Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2011, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/  
indusclient.php?id=n01&year=2011. 
14 Id. 
15  Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2010, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient_lobs 
.php?id=n01&year=2010; Lobbying Spending Database Food & Beverage, 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 10 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
only reflects the reported contributions, indicating that there could be more 
funds contributed through additional means, although the numbers are 
already rather high.16  For example, in the 2011 fiscal year, Coca-Cola 
invested $5,890,000, Pepsi-Co, Inc. $3,260,000, the National Restaurant 
Association $2,549,500, Mars Inc. $2,250,000, and McDonald's Corporation 
$1,555,000.17 These numbers show that the food lobby consists mainly of 
promoters of unhealthy snack and fast foods with immense power in the 
policy and law-making process in the United States. 
Food producers stack the deck in order to push dietary recommendations 
that benefit their companies by marketing snack foods and fast foods as 
healthful. Although government officials may not directly accept funds from 
the industry,18 Big Food has nonetheless found loopholes to manipulate the 
law in its favor19 by "lobbying with massive resources to stifle government 
action."20  Big Food buys the science to support the false health claims 
regarding mainstream snack and fast foods, thereby assuring that the dietary 
                                                                                                                              
2011, THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
lobby/indusclient_lobs.php?id=n01&year=2011. 
16 See id. 
17  Lobbying Spending Database-Coca-Cola Co, 2011, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?id 
=D000000212&year=2011; Lobbying Spending Database-McDonald's Corp, 
2011, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
firmsum.php?id=D000000373&year=2011; Lobbying Spending Database-
National Restaurant Assn, 2011, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?id=D000000150&year=2011; 
Lobbying Spending Database-PepsiCo Inc., 2011, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmsum.php?id=D000000200 
&year=2011. 
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). 
19 T. COLIN CAMPBELL & THOMAS M. CAMPBELL II, THE CHINA STUDY 
311 (2006). 
20 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 259. 
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guidelines are favorable to the foods Big Food promotes. Dr. Colin Campbell, 
professor of nutritional biochemistry at Cornell University and co-author of 
The China Study,21 explains: 
[A]cademic scientists can receive personal compensation 
from industry while simultaneously undertaking 
government-sponsored activities of considerable public 
importance. Ironically, they can even help set the agenda 
for the same government authorities who have long been 
restricted from such corporate associations. It is a huge 
"conflict-of-interest" loophole allowing industries to 
exercise their influence through the side door of 
academia. In effect, the entire system is essentially under 
the control of industry. The government and academic 
communities, playing their respective roles, mostly do as 
they are expected. . . .22 
The conflict-of-interest loophole that Dr. Campbell describes must be closed 
in order to transform the FDA and USDA into true consumer protection 
agencies instead of Big Food's public relation agencies. Both the FDA and the 
USDA play their roles in favoring the industry by issuing dietary guidelines 
that encourage the consumption of products that the food lobby vigorously 
promotes and, in addition, supports the unhealthy dietary recommendations 
through industry-funded research.23 
                                                        
21 The China Study describes the findings of the China-Cornell-Oxford 
Project, which was a long-term study conducted by the Chinese Academy of 
Preventive Medicine, Cornell University, and the University of Oxford, UK. 
CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 7, 22. The New York Times 
described this study as "the Grand Prix of epidemiology." Jane E. Brody, 
Huge Study of Diet Indicts Fat and Meat, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1990, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1990/05/08/science/huge-study-of-diet-indicts-fat-and-
meat.html. 
22 CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 311. 
23 See NESTLE, supra note 6, at 93. 
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2. GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS 
Government-industry partnerships are strong and ubiquitous24 and assist 
Big Food in boosting its sales by including its products in the dietary 
guidelines. When the FDA, USDA, or the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) partner with industry representatives in 
so-called government-industry partnerships, the federal agencies are bound to 
give Big Food a say in their policies even though the agencies should act 
independently. The end-result of Big Food's influence in the process of 
drafting and issuing guidelines are recommendations that are harmful to 
public health because they are designed to boost Big Food's profits instead of 
protecting consumer health. The shift away from consumer protection in the 
recommendations' focus is possible due to the conflict-of-interest loophole. 
Michele Simon, a public health lawyer, author, and law professor 
specializing in public health policy, blames the "[t]he cozy connection 
between the Federal Government and industry [which] is further cemented in 
so-called public-private partnerships aimed at allowing the two sectors to 
'work together. . . .'"25 The President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sport, 
for example, is supposed to advise the DHHS Secretary on healthy lifestyle 
choices,26 but is deeply conflicted by its industry partnerships. Simon points 
                                                        
24  See generally MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT: HOW THE 
FOOD INDUSTRY UNDERMINES OUR HEALTH AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK 
(2006). 
25 Id. at 158. 
26 The President's Council on Fitness, Sports & Nutrition website sets 
forth the organization's mission as follows: 
The President's Council . . . [is] to serve in an advisory 
capacity through the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services. . . . Through partnerships with the public, 
private, and non-profit sectors, the Council promotes 
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out that "the council's focus on this single issue while partnering with major 
food companies detracts from nutrition policy and other thorny political 
questions that could spell trouble for industry."27 Simon aptly points out the 
absurdity of the government-industry partnerships by asking, "what is a 
fitness council doing partnering with General Mills, makers of such empty-
calorie products such as Lucky Charms cereal, Pillsbury cookies, and Häagen 
Dazs ice cream?"28 Such partnerships are merely another way for the food 
industry to manipulate the government into favorable actions to boost Big 
Food's sales. 
Proof that the FDA favors the industry appears in many places. One 
example is a 1993 defensive article for The Food & Drug Law Journal by 
Sharon Smith Holston, former Associate Commissioner for Management and 
Deputy Commissioner for International and Constituent Relations within the 
FDA. Holston wrote the article during the peak time of revolving-door policy, 
(see part D below), at the FDA and USDA, and explained how important 
close collaboration with the industry is for these agencies while explicitly 
admitting to the conflict of interest.29 She writes: 
                                                                                                                              
programs and initiatives that motivate people of all ages, 
backgrounds, and abilities to lead active, healthy lives. 
About PCFSN, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON FITNESS, SPORTS & NUTRITION, 
http://www.fitness.gov/about-pcfsn/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
27 SIMON, supra note 24, at 159. 
28 Id. 
29 Sharon Smith Holston explains the FDA-industry partnership: 
[A]t the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), we 
recognize how integral it is to have good working 
relationships and productive interactions with industry to 
accomplish our mission. Simply put, we at the FDA 
would like to think that we are partners with industry 
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It is important that [the FDA] continue to work to 
improve the partnership that now exists between the 
FDA and regulated industry. It would be good to be able 
to report next year on the progress that has been made 
and the resources that have been re-channeled toward the 
FDA's mission-oriented consumer protection activities as 
a result of our improved partnership. This will be 
possible only if the FDA and regulated industry work 
"hand-in-glove." The FDA welcomes interest in the 
agency and looks forward to continuing to work together 
with industry.30 
Although her conception of a food industry that acts in the consumer's best 
interest and collaborates toward this goal with the FDA is ideal, it is 
unrealistic. Holston advocates for industry-government interactions, which 
leads to the conclusion that she is in favor of the industry's investment in 
government-controlled research and is concerned with the profitability of the 
companies sponsoring the research of the FDA.31 It is clear that this admission 
reveals the intent to inextricably intertwine the FDA and the industry;32 a 
revelation that could come as a shock to many consumers, as Holston 
seemingly welcomes the industry without much concern for the associated 
conflicts-of-interest. 
                                                                                                                              
working toward a common goal—providing consumers 
with safe, high-quality products. 
Sharon Smith Holston, Contact with the FDA-Ground Rules for Industry and 
Constraints for Agency Personnel When Interacting with Industry, 48 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 35, 35 (1993). 
30 Id. at 39–40. 
31 See id. at 35 (clarifying how "government employees and the private 
sector can, and should, interact."). 
32 See generally MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER'S 
MANIFESTO (2008) (describing influences on the American diet and how that 
diet must change). 
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Government-industry partnerships give the industry too much power 
over the government. The 20 years following her statement prove that the 
food politics worsened and that Big Food has gained even more power over 
the consumer protection agencies. As a result of these partnerships, Big Food 
erased much of the FDA's impartiality toward the industry. 
Thirteen years after Holston's statement, Richard M. Cooper, an 
accomplished FDA lawyer who defends the food and tobacco industries,33 
made a similar admission to the conflict-of-interest in an apologetic article. 
He explains that when government agents' "views of science, ethics, or 
economics are contrary to any of these legal authorities, the official is 
required to follow the authorities, not his or her personal views."34 Despite 
these virtuous obligations, he explains that, in reality, "the legal authorities 
require or encourage FDA personnel to apply science, ethics, and/or 
economics as they understand them,"35 which is more often than not the way 
Big Food and Big Tobacco manipulate the other agencies' understanding of 
the science and ethics (emphasis added). Cooper also remarks that 
"[u]pholding the Constitution and laws comes second" 36  after the ethical 
obligations of FDA and other government officials. Taking into consideration 
Holston's rendition of the FDA's duties to the industry, Part III will explain 
the problem with Cooper's statement is that the ethical standards are by no 
means controllable or enforceable; they work to the detriment of the 
consumers when the interests of the industry and consumers collide. This 
imbalance causes the economic stimulus from the industry to prevail over 
                                                        
33 Richard M. Cooper, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, http://www.wc 
.com/rcooper (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
34 Richard M. Cooper, Science, Ethics and Economics in FDA Decision-
Making: The Legal Framework, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 799, 799 (2006). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 800. 
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consumer protection principles.37 Cooper also justifies the implied exclusion 
of consumer interests by citing case law about the intentional inclusion of 
certain legal principles and exclusion of others as an accepted governmental 
practice.38 Thus, unless the law specifically outlaws any conflict-of-interest 
between consumer protection agencies and the food or drug industry, even 
the brightest minds working for the FDA, and by analogy the USDA, will fail 
to become immune to the dangerous industry's bias (see parts B and C 
below). 
3. BIG FOOD'S PLAYBOOK 
The large American agribusinesses and food industrialists seem to have 
a playbook of strategies to gain a competitive advantage in the market by 
                                                        
37 Cooper and Holston show no remorse in favoring the industry. For 
example, Cooper explains that 
[t]he law, as understood by FDA, also sometimes 
requires the agency to apply economics. In setting 
tolerances for contaminants in food under section 406 of 
the FDCA, FDA applies a risk-benefit standard that 
incorporates an economic assessment of the cost of food 
foregone. Moreover, under the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act of 1980, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995, the Congressional Review Act, and Executive 
Order 12866, FDA is required to conduct economic 
analyses of a number of the agency's regulatory 
initiatives. 
Id. at 800–01 (footnotes omitted). 
38 "The very fact that the legal authorities that govern FDA expressly 
require consideration of science, ethics, and economics in some 
circumstances supports an arguable inference that those legal authorities also, 
by plain implication, exclude consideration of such factors in other 
circumstances." Cooper, supra note 34, at 801 (footnote omitted). 
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stifling any dietary recommendations that could diminish their sales. In an 
article comparing Big Food to Big Tobacco, Kelly D. Brownell and Kenneth 
E. Warner, explain that Big Food and its agents are "pressur[ing] 
administration officials into accepting weak and ineffective nutrition 
policies"39 and "creat[ing] confusion and doubt about sound science on food 
and health"40 in an organized manner. This strategic manipulation seems to 
follow a playbook similar to that of Big Tobacco two decades ago. 41 
Moreover, Big Food has the potential to do more damage than Big Tobacco 
did because of its diverse "industry players."42 As exhibited by the earlier 
description of the food and beverage lobby, Big Food's parent companies, 
such as Pepsi-Co, McDonald's and Yum! Brands, organize themselves 
politically through "lobbyists, lawyers, and trade organizations that in turn 
represent a type of food"43 which is usually a snack or fast food high in fat 
and sugar. Examples of such organizations are the Snack Food Association, 
which mainly consists of junk food producers,44 or the American Beverage 
Association, mainly consisting of soft and sports drink sellers members.45 
                                                        
39  Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 262–63 (internal citations 
omitted). 
40 SIMON, supra note 24, at 172. 
41 Id. 
42 See Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 263 ("[F]ood involves an 
immense array of products made by thousands of companies worldwide. The 
industry is diverse and fragmented . . . counting as its players . . . an organic 
farmer; mega companies like Kraft, McDonalds, and Coca-Cola; and even 
Girl Scouts selling cookies. The same company making fried foods laden 
with saturated fat might also sell whole-grain cereal."). 
43 Id. 
44 Snack Food Association Member Directory, SNACK FOOD 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.sfa.org/memberdirectory.php (last visited Oct. 17, 
2012). Note that the conflict of interest has developed into a political co-
dependency between the government and the food industry. Politicians even 
ask for Big Food's support in their campaigns and indebt themselves to the 
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Other ways in which lobbyists are organized are thorough representation 
from within the food industry. This representation is powerful enough to 
stifle the ultimate and overarching healthy food recommendation, namely to 
eat less, because "[a] shrinking market . . . would mean less money—a lot 
less"46 for all the aforementioned industry groups. Another way to organize 
lobbyists is through the industry branch, such as the National Restaurant 
Association.47  An additional way is via a constituent group of the food 
industry, such as the National Sugar Association.48 Finally, a fourth way to 
organize is through the collaboration of the entire industry, such as the Grocer 
Manufacturers Association, which combines the effort of all major grocery 
chains in the country.49 
                                                                                                                              
large monetary contributions. See Gov. Huckabee at SNAXPO 2012: About 
Snacks and Politics, SNACK FOOD ASSOCIATION, http://www.sfa.org/ 
news.php?id=69 (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
45 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 263; see generally AMERICAN 
BEVERAGE ASSOCIATION, http://www.ameribev.org/members/active-
members/. 
46 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 263. 
47  See generally NATIONAL RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, http:// 
www.restaurant.org/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Further proof that 
these associations and partnerships merely marks the promotion of unhealthy 
food choices is the "Healthy Dining Finder" program, sponsored by the 
National Restaurant Association's and linked to its homepage, featuring a 
350-calorie McDonald's chicken burger and pizza. See HEALTHY DINING 
FINDER, http://www.healthydiningfinder.com/restaurant-partners/get-featured 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012). The Healthy Dining Finder also provides 
resources and links to nutritionists who were likely schooled to promote Big 
Food's spin of a healthy diet to boost sales among diet-conscious consumers. 
Id. 
48 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 263. 
49 Id. For members of the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), 
see generally Our Members, GMA, http://www.gmaonline.org/forms/ 
MemberDirectory/viewMemberDirectoryAll (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
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Brownell and Warner described the food industry's playbook as 
"suggest[ing] maneuvers to thwart changes that would benefit public health—
strategies that may ultimately be self-defeating."50 The first strategy consists 
of "[l]aying claim to concern for the public while continuing its destructive 
practices. . . ."51 For example, the industry claims to protect school children 
from the side effects of soft drinks high in sugar and thus, removed soda 
machines from many schools. However, the soda machines were replaced 
with sports drink machines, which are high in caffeine and yield similar 
profits. Studies have shown that "[t]he pharmacology of caffeine shows clear 
patterns of dependence, with signs of tolerance and withdrawal."52 Despite 
evidence that the taste of caffeine is virtually undetectable, the food industry 
continues to assert that caffeine enhances flavor, so they continue to add 
caffeine to foods that they want to sell to unsuspicious consumers: "potato 
chips, jelly beans, sunflower seeds, and candy bars."53 All of these foods 
appear in school vending machines.54 
The intentional manipulation of foods is unconscionable because 
"[c]affeine may be an important player regarding poor nutrition and obesity 
because it is so often coupled with calories."55 The removal and replacement 
of soda machines further proves that while Big Food appears to do good, in 
reality, Big Food only changes the way in which it boosts profits for its 
members at the cost of children's health. 
                                                        
50 Id. at 286. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 281 (internal citations omitted). 
53 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 281 (internal citations omitted). 
54 See generally VEND-UCATION: HEALTHY VENDING MACHINES FOR 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, http://www.vendingmachinesschools.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2012). 
55 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 279 (internal citations omitted). 
"Soft drinks, energy drinks, coffee (with cream and sugar), and other foods to 
which caffeine is added deliver a great many calories to their consumers." Id. 
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Although the National School Lunch Program and the USDA should 
protect public school children from the obesity and diet-related diseases 
resulting from junk food sales in schools, the opposite is the case. The USDA 
promotes unhealthy food choices and teaches children to become Big Food's 
loyal consumers at the cost of their health and wellbeing.56 
A second strategy that Brownell and Warner noticed in Big Food's 
playbook consists of "formulating products in ways that maximize their 
addictive potential" 57  with the likely goal of increasing sales. The dairy 
industry, for example, accomplishes such increases in addictive substances 
through high concentrations of casein in cheese. Joseph Keon, author of 
Whitewash: The Disturbing Truth About Cow's Milk and Your Health, 
explained that milk contains natural opiates (exorphins) that are designed to 
stimulate calves to return to the cow to be fed.58 These opiates, one of which 
is casein, force consumers to keep wanting and buying more dairy products. 
Since 1915, the per capita cheese consumption in the U.S. increased six-
fold.59  This increase correlates with the steady and improved public 
perception of dairy in the food pyramid,60 a major component of the dairy 
industry's effort to promote an increase in dairy consumption. Increasing the 
addictive properties of certain foods that are promoted by the government's 
                                                        
56 See generally Kid-friendly veggies and fruits, CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV 
(June 2011), http://www.choosemyplate.gov/food-groups/downloads/ 
TenTips/DGTipsheet11KidFriendlyVeggiesAndFruits.pdf; National School 
Lunch Program, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD AND 
NUTRITION SERVICE (June 21, 2012), http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/. 
57 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 286. 
58 JOSEPH KEON, WHITEWASH: THE DISTURBING TRUTH ABOUT COW'S 
MILK AND YOUR HEALTH 36 (2010). 
59 Id. 
60 The Food Pyramid is an illustration of the 2005 dietary guidelines. 
The MyPyramid.gov website was replaced by http://www.choosemyplate 
.gov/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). Both MyPyramid and MyPlate are 
discussed in greater details in Part II (A) below. 
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dietary guidelines further demonstrates how Big Food manipulates what 
people eat. 
Additional strategies in Big Food's playbook includes "paying scientists 
to do research that helps the industry, funding front groups, using money to 
influence professional organizations, failing to rein in trade associations that 
distort science and mak[ing] doubt one of their deliverables . . . ."61 In 2008 
for example, Coca-Cola, paid to enter into a partnership with the American 
Dietetic Association (ADA) to allow its partners to speak at national ADA 
meetings to gain "access to key influencers, thought leaders and decision 
makers in the nutrition marketplace."62 Of course, this generosity came at a 
price, namely that "the Coca-Cola Company will share research findings with 
ADA members. . . ." As a result of this partnership, "[t]he ADA has taken a 
strong stand that there are no good foods or bad foods, a position that the 
food industry has then exploited"63 in wide-ranging advertising campaigns. 
One example of these campaigns is the television commercial "Question 
Mark" by the Corn Refiner's Association, claiming that all sugars are 
equal64—a factually incorrect statement on the molecular level and in terms 
                                                        
61 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 286. 
62 Id. at 277 (internal citations omitted). 
63 Id. 
64 TV Commercial: Question Mark (Corn Refiners' Association 2010), 
http://www.cornsugar.com/video-gallery/. 
High fructose corn syrup is simply a kind of corn sugar that is 
metabolized by your body the same as sugar or honey. The 
term 'corn sugar' today is an FDA approved alternate label 
name for dextrose, a corn-based sweetener that contains no 
fructose. When we use the phrase 'corn sugar,' we are using it 
to describe high fructose corn syrup as a form of sugar made 
from corn. 
See also Adland, The Corn Refiners Association—Corn Sugar / Question 
mark—(2010) (Sept. 15, 2010), http://adland.tv/commercials/corn-refiners-
association-corn-sugar-question-mark-2010. But see DAVID L. NELSON & 
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of humans' physiological absorption of sugars. The Corn Refiner's 
Association's website features quotes from various health professionals who 
support the incorrect statement, which provides further proof of experts and 
FDA officials who are manipulated to make false health claims to boost sales.  
Since creating the ADA-Coca-Cola partnership in 2008, the ADA has 
continuously provided research results and studies to the scientists who 
served on the 2010 advisory committee. Unsuspicious health care 
practitioners will continue to follow the ADA's advice and fall into Coca-
Cola's hands at the expense of the federal agency's integrity. The 
consequences are explosive, and "[u]ltimately, Americans pay the high cost 
of government complicity—with their health."65 This is only one of many 
examples in Big Food's bag of tricks. 
Where the previously independent ADA most likely criticized the food 
industry's products, Big Food has now started to collaborate with several 
professional associations that previously opposed the fast food industry. For 
example, the ADA's Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics claims that there is 
little medical support to reduce the sugar consumption.66 This statement stems 
from a scientifically unsound and heavily biased report, which is another 
example of Big Food's manipulation of science.67  In sum, Big Food's 
playbook is diverse. Food industrialists' creative strategists use "heavy 
ammunition"68 when the agribusiness or fast food industry is "[c]aught in the 
                                                                                                                              
MICHAEL M. COX, LEHNIGER PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 241 (4th ed. 
2005) (A table of monosaccharides and disaccharides illustrates the chemical 
compositions and differences of various types of sugars.). 
65 SIMON, supra note 24, at 165. 
66 Am. Dietetic Ass'n, Position of the American Dietetic Association: 
Use of Nutritive and Nonnutritive Sweeteners, J. Am. Diet Assoc., Feb. 2004, 
at 255, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14760578. 
67 Id. 
68  Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 262. "As an example, in 
response to menu-labeling initiatives, the restaurant industry has sued New 
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crosshairs."69 The soundness of the science used as a basis for the dietary 
guidelines "com[es] right out of the industry's playbook"70 and pervades the 
dietary recommendations issued every five years by the USDA. 
B. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH: PLANTING DOUBT 
IN SCIENCE 
Conflicts of interest permeate the scientific bases of the dietary 
recommendations in addition to the individuals serving on the advisory 
committees making the recommendations. Federal law requires that "[t]he 
information and guidelines contained in each report . . . shall be based on the 
preponderance of the scientific and medical knowledge which is current at the 
time the report is prepared."71 The soundness of the science is the fundamen-
tal building block for the dietary guidelines. As the ADA's endorsement of 
sugar consumption above illustrates that Big Food, through its professional 
and government agents, disclaims all science that could hamper its sales as 
unsound.72 Big Food highjacks true scientific progress to boost its profits at 
the cost of public health. 
The corruption of scientific research, professional organizations, and 
government agencies for mere economic gain is a dangerous practice that 
must come to a stop. This "corporate takeover of academic research . . . 
threatens to undermine the entire scientific process."73  Michele Simon 
                                                                                                                              
York City, used its political might to weaken legislation in California, and 
successfully encouraged federal legislators to introduce weak national 
legislation that would preempt states and cities from acting more 
aggressively." Id. 
69 Id. 
70 SIMON, supra note 24, at 161. 
71 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(2) (2006). 
72 SIMON, supra note 24, at 161. 
73 Id. at 171. 
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explains that the resulting danger is "particularly worrisome in the case of 
food and nutrition . . . ."74 Instead of instructing people to eat more fruits, 
vegetables, nuts and grains, and to limit the intake of refined carbohydrates, 
sugars and trans-fats, the food guidelines seem to be more concerned about 
methods of tiptoeing around the fast food producers' feelings.75  Michele 
Simon notes that "when it comes to solving the nation's epidemic of diet-
related diseases, Uncle Sam is more aligned with Big Food than with the 
citizens it's supposed to represent."76 But for the conflict-of-interest loophole, 
it would not be that easy for Big Food to control the American diet and to 
manipulate nutrition science. 
Big Food also manipulates science by creating industry front groups, 
such as the Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF), the "king of the PR 
empire,"77 as Michele Simon calls it. CCF is one of many examples of how 
the food industry organizes its attack on anybody who could hamper its 
profitability. She explains that CCF's strategy "include[s]: (1) lobbying 
against nutrition legislation unfriendly to industry interests, (2) preparing 
well-timed press releases, (3) publishing op-ed articles and letters to the 
editor, and (4) advertising its views. . . ."78  Thus, Big Food meddles so 
profoundly in the advisory committee's actions, that it converts these federal 
bodies into an industry tool to boost profit. 
As a result of Big Food's meddling, the manipulated scientific bases for 
the dietary guidelines lose credibility and become a farce in Big Food's 
toolbox. Michele Simon remarks how important it is "that scientific research 
remain unfettered by corporate interests. As more and more health experts 
and organizations slide down the slippery slope of accepting corporate 
                                                        
74 Id. at 172. 
75 Id. at 144–45. 
76 SIMON, supra note 24, at 143. 
77 Id. at 172. 
78 Id. at 173. 
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funding, we will ultimately lose a critical tool for effective policymaking."79 
When unsuspicious consumers and health professionals rely on this unsound 
science, as it is promulgated through Big Food's players, such as the ADA, an 
organization that has been compromised by Big Food, encourages people to 
make unhealthy food choices80 that endanger their health, as the latter half of 
this paper will demonstrate. Jeff Herman warns that "[w]ith incomplete or 
inaccurate information, the government is unable to appropriately shape 
nutritional programs and people are deprived of the opportunity to make fully 
informed choices regarding their health."81 Although Big Food's "deliberate 
strategy to buy loyalty and to instill doubt: to confuse the public, give 
ammunition to political allies, and stall or prevent government action"82 has 
gained acceptance among health professionals and, by association, in 
consumer protection agencies, it remains dangerous to public health. 
C. FOOD GOVERNMENTENOMICS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
FDA AND USDA FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES  
One way to manipulate the dietary guidelines in Big Food's favor is by 
manipulating the experts who issue the recommendations to the USDA. 
Often, nutrition experts serve as members on the USDA advisory committees 
while they have recent, ongoing, or prospective ties to the industry.83 When 
these experts on the committees receive research grants, for example, it is 
likely that they will issue recommendations in an effort to avoid upsetting the 
industry sponsors. As a result, the recommendations may be—and often 
                                                        
79 Id. at 192. 
80 Herman, supra note 4, at 289. 
81 Id. 
82 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 278. 
83 See generally NESTLE, supra note 6. 
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are—biased84 because "[s]cientists feel pressure to favor industry."85 Studies 
showed that, 
63 percent of scientists conducting clinical studies who 
received gifts from industry felt that the donor expected 
acknowledgment in publications, 32 percent felt the 
donor expected to review articles or reports before 
publication, and 29 percent felt the donor expected that 
the gift would not be used for commercial applications 
that might compete with the company's products.86 
                                                        
84 Herman explains: 
Yet even where the expert might act in the best interests 
of the Committee, his/her ties to industry may create a 
risk and a perception he/she will not do so. Thus, even if 
an expert's relationships with industry are all in the past, 
he/she may appear less likely than other experts to follow 
the science, as he/she: 1) may feel a sense of duty to 
represent the interests of his/her former employers and 
sources of funding; 2) may have developed biased views 
of the science after serving industry interests; and/or 
3) may try to secure new relationships by protecting 
industry interests. Even if these experts act completely 
professionally and follow the science, which they may, 
the public's trust in the process may still be 
compromised. 
Herman, supra note 4, at 296. 
85 Id. at 297. 
86 Herman, supra note 4, at 297 (citing Erie G. Campbell et al., Looking 
a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Corporate Gifts Supporting Life Sciences 
Research, 279 JAMA 995, 997 (1998)). 
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The more advisory committee members entertain this line of thought, the 
more biased their recommendations will be. Likewise, the more power 
realized by the industry, the more pressure it will put on the advisory 
committee. 
An alternative method of manipulating the advisory committees "is to 
invite academic experts to participate"87 in industry-funded research. In fact, 
such partnerships with the industry are quite common. According to an article 
published in the Food and Drug Law Journal in 2010, 
three out of 11 members on the 1995 Committee had past 
or present industry ties . . . seven out of 11 members on 
the 2000 Committee . . . 11 out of 13 members on the 
2005 Committee . . . and currently nine out of 13 
members on the 2010 Committee . . . . These 
relationships are substantial. For example, on just the 
2000 Committee. . . , members had past or present ties 
to: two meat associations; four dairy associations and 
five dairy companies; one egg association; one sugar 
association; one grain association; five other food 
companies; six other industry-sponsored associations; 
two pharmaceutical associations; and 28 pharmaceutical 
companies.88 
Such government-industry partnerships increase the pressure on scientists 
serving on the committees until they bow to the industry's demands. 
Even if the advisory committees refuse to give in to Big Food's 
demands, the industry often gets its way. Dr. David Aaron Kessler, 
pediatrician, lawyer, renowned author, and former Commissioner of the FDA, 
recounts that the food industry pressured the government agencies into 
                                                        
87 SIMON, supra note 24, at 162. 
88 Herman, supra note 4, at 295–96 (internal citations omitted). 
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passing the food labeling laws in its favor and that the beef industry affected 
the daily recommended caloric intake in dietary guidelines.89 He writes: 
From the White House, the pressure moved down to the 
Office of Management and Budget, which had the power 
to block our regulations. As required, we had submitted 
draft after draft of the final rule to [the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)] and often had it 
returned to us with industry-sought changes. More than 
once, OMB's wording had been taken almost verbatim 
from food industry comments we had already carefully 
considered.90 
Thus, by increasing the allotted caloric intake, the meat, dairy, and sugar 
industries assured that their sales would not be stifled by "eat less" dietary 
recommendations. 
Not only do Big Food players try to influence government officials, they 
also wage intimidation crusades against any critics of their foods who could 
uncover the truth behind the unwarranted health claims of their products. For 
example, Marion Nestle, a renowned author and Professor in the Department 
of Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health at New York University 
recounts a threatening letter she received from the Sugar Association in 
2002,91 demanding that she repeal factually correct but economically harmful 
                                                        
89 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 274; David Kessler's biography 
on Bio 2004 Newsroom, accessed via WaybackMachine (beta), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070927222933/http://www.bio.org/events/2004
/media/brunch/kessler.asp. 
90 Id. (internal citations omitted), accessed via WaybackMachine (beta), 
http://www.aeispeakers.com/speakerbio.php?SpeakerID=558. 
91  Letter from Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum, Venable, Baetejer, Howard & 
Ciciletti, LLP, to Marion Nestle, Department of Nutrition and Food Studies, 
New York University (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.foodpolitics 
.com/wp-content/uploads/SugarAssociationLetter.pdf. 
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statements to high-sugar food sales. Again, in February 2012, the Sugar 
Association threatened her with a letter to allegedly provide accurate sugar 
consumption data,92 which were unrecognizably distorted and scientifically 
flawed. This time, Andrew C. Briscoe, President and Chief Executive Officer 
of the Sugar Association, contacted Professor Nestle personally, rather than 
through a lawyer as the Sugar Association did in 2002. He demanded Nestle's 
compliance with the Sugar Association's advertisements.93 After all, the Sugar 
Association, as one of Big Food's major players, unscrupulously defends its 
distorted science to eliminate any opposition. Even worse, the Sugar 
Association proudly showcases Briscoe's letter on its website with the 
obvious intent to suppress critics of refined sugar and to assure supporters.94 
The letter presents heavily biased data about the nutritional and caloric value 
of sugar. In fact, according to Dr. Harris, physician and author of The 
Scientific Basis of Vegetarianism, Briscoe's distorted interpretation of USDA 
data,95  which he attached to his letter to Professor Nestle, borders on 
malevolent misrepresentation. Sound science and the truth do not deter Big 
Food's major players from seizing control over the USDA's work product—
they simply twist the data interpretations. Big Food coerces anything or 
anyone critical of its products into compliance in order to protect its 
profitability. 
                                                        
92  Letter from Andrew C. Briscoe, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of The Sugar Association, to Marion Nestle, Professor with Chair 
Nutrition, Food Studies, & Public Health at the Steinhardt School of Culture, 
Education, and Human Development Education, New York University 
(Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.sugar.org/images/docs/letter-to-
marion-nestle.pdf. 
93 Id. 
94 The Sugar Assoc., The Sugar Association Letter to Dr. Marion Nestle 
Providing Accurate Sugars Consumption Data, SUGAR: SWEET BY NATURE, 
http://www.sugar.org/press-releases/letter-to-marion-nestle.html. 
95 HARRIS, supra note 6, at 92–97. 
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In addition to influencing the advisory committee members' decision, 
the industry also "deploy[s] third party experts"96 such as members of health 
profession associations for their cause. One of the most detrimental examples 
involves the integrity of the aforementioned ADA, which is completely 
compromised, not only because of its partnership with Coca-Cola but also 
because the ADA is a member of the American Council on Fitness and 
Nutrition (ACFN). Michele Simon calls the ACFN "one of the most infamous 
front groups of" Big Food97 and, thus, she awarded the special "Chuzpah 
Award" to the American Diabetes Association (also ADA), which "boasts a 
veritable rogue's gallery of corporate funders, including Kraft Foods, J.M. 
Smucker, General Mills, and H.J. Heinz."98  The resulting collaboration 
between snack and fast food producers and the ADA erases the ADA's 
credibility in making healthy diet recommendations. 
Another food governmentenomics strategy used to boost profits by 
sabotaging America's health is to buy partnerships affiliated with professional 
health associations.99 Michele Simon explains that these alliances comply 
with Big Food's spin of a well-rounded diet. When members of those 
associations become members of the federal advisory committees, the 
industry exercises particular control over the dietary guidelines. "[I]t is 
particularly egregious when certain groups take money from those companies 
whose products are causing the very problems they are supposedly trying to 
combat,"100 such as the American Heart Association and the American Cancer 
Association, which sell stickers of approval to snack food producers for 
advertisements on the food packages.101  Big Food's meddling thereby 
                                                        
96 SIMON, supra note 24, at 172. 
97 Id. at 176. 
98 Id. at 182. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 192. 
101 SIMON, supra note 24, at 182. 
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"ensures government gridlock for the foreseeable future."102 Consequently, 
not only are the professionals serving on the committees and representing the 
professional associations adopting a favorable bias to the industry, but their 
interpretation and use of research also results in conflicted science. If 
Congress does not close the loopholes allowing such corruption, Big Food 
may reduce the health claims and research from these professional 
organizations to snack food trade dress, the colorful wrappers of processed, 
nutritiously lacking foods. 
D. HOW THE FDA & USDA ACT AS REVOLVING DOORS TO 
BENEFIT THE INDUSTRY 
When government employees swing from USDA or FDA positions to 
the private sector and back, while supporting Big Food with their work, they 
become "revolvers." The revolvers provide the industry with "soft money" in 
the form of "legal but unsanctioned . . . gifts and . . . frequent job exchanges 
between lobbyists and federal officials known as the 'revolving door.'"103 In 
2009, 252 people were revolvers, which make up 72.4% of the food and 
beverage lobbyists.104  Phrased slightly differently, more than half of the 
lobbyists obtain government positions with the FDA or USDA to push for 
Big Food's interest in government agencies. In 2011, 191 congressional 
committee members passed through this revolving door in the food and 
beverage industry,105  in 2010, 226 members,106  and in 2009, 252.107  This 
                                                        
102 Id. at 161. 
103 NESTLE, supra note 6, at 99. 
104 Lobbying: Food & Beverage, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=n01&year=2009. 
105 Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2011, supra note 13. 
106 Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2010, supra note 15. 
107 Lobbying: Food & Beverage Industry Profile, 2009, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient_lobs 
.php?id=n01&year=2009. 
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amounts to 646 highly skilled and trained lobbyists who passed through the 
revolving door in just three years. The soft money is unrestricted and 
unreported,108 so there is likely much more employee shifting and money 
involved than what consumers are aware of. These shocking numbers prove 
how Big Food has permeated the government and created a network of public 
health saboteurs by high jacking the FDA and USDA. The revolving door 
practices date back to the early 1970's and has had a long and successful track 
record.109 
1. THE FDA AND USDA REVOLVING DOOR 
One of the worst revolving door careers is that of Michael Taylor, which 
evidences the "cross-over effect"110  between the food industry and 
government. As soon as he graduated from the University of Virginia School 
of Law in 1976, he worked for the FDA. He quickly passed through the 
revolving door and went to the private-sector law firm King & Spalding to 
represent Monsanto, one of the world's leading and most corrupt 
agribusinesses.111 A few years later, Taylor returned to the government, this 
time as FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy where, according to Marion 
Nestle, he issued biotechnology friendly policies to get Monsanto's rBGH 
growth hormone for dairy cows FDA approval.112  In 1994, Taylor went 
                                                        
108 NESTLE, supra note 6, at 105. 
109 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 276. See also HARRIS, supra 
note 6, at 101. 
110 Harris, supra note 6, at 103. 
111 See Monsanto: The Parable of the Sower: The Debate Over Whether 
Monsanto Is a Corporate Sinner or Saint, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2009, 
available at http://www.economist.com/NODE/14904184/PRINT. 
112  rBGH is a growth hormone for dairy cows that boosts milk 
production by 10 percent. The hormone, however, remains in the milk when 
it is consumed by humans and causes various health complications, including 
several forms of cancer. Monsanto pressured the FDA into declaring rBGH 
safe and lobbied to avoid food labeling laws from mandating that milk from 
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through the revolving door again to administer the USDA's Food Safety and 
Inspection Service. Four years later, in 1998, he had accomplished so much 
for Monsanto as a revolver, that the agribusiness giant appointed him Vice 
President for Public Policy.113 Taylor's abuse of his government and private 
industry connections is one of many terrible examples of Big Food's 
unscrupulous and crooked manipulation of the USDA and FDA without 
regard for the consequences.114 
Revolvers show little remorse in exploiting the government for Big 
Food's profit at the expense of America's public health. For example, Steven 
Anderson, president and CEO of the National Restaurant Association until 
January 2007,115 was asked about "the role of restaurants in contributing to 
the obesity problem,"116 and replied that "[j]ust because we have electricity 
doesn't mean you have to electrocute yourself."117  This proves how Big 
Food's strategy to shift the burden on to the public at the expense of 
America's health and in order to boost profits continues to be framed by the 
industry.118 Anderson puts the blame on consumers for eating unhealthy food 
                                                                                                                              
rBGH treated cows be labeled as such. See generally KEON, supra note 58, at 
34, 62; see also NESTLE, supra note 6, at 101. 
113 NESTLE, supra note 6, at 101. 
114 For a detailed list of revolvers and lobbyists, see generally Herman, 
supra note 4, at 309–16. 
115 Statement by National Restaurant Association Chairman Edward R. 
Tinsley III on Resignation of President and Chief Executive Officer Steven 
C. Anderson, available at (Jan. 24, 2007), http://www.restaurant.org/ 
pressroom/pressrelease/?id=1373. 
116 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 266. 
117 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
118 Id. at 266–67. 
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and fails to even consider that the bombardment of fast and snack food 
advertising encourages people to make unhealthy choices.119 
2. PAYING THEIR WAY OUT OF OPPOSITION 
If all of the strategies to control and manipulate the dietary guidelines 
fail, Big Food pays itself out of opposition with what seems to be charitable 
work. Such investments of corporate social responsibility illusions are also 
geared at improving profitability by "buying loyalty, or at least stifling 
opposition, from groups that might otherwise oppose a company's business 
practices,"120  as Brownell and Warner explain. Examples are fast food 
franchises on university campuses and in hospital lobbies or the Ronald 
McDonald House charities,121 where the company donates houses to poor 
families and assures that children's needs are met. Although these projects do 
not directly affect the American diet, they buy Big Food loyalty and increase 
credibility, so that any critique or recommendations from its representatives 
                                                        
119 Consumer generally allow Big Food to make food choices for them: 
Each consumer takes the blame for this "diet of 
conscientious inconsistency" because most people 
choose to eat what allegedly tastes good and prefer not to 
think about the consequences. Moreover, people let 
advertisements tell them what tastes good and then eat an 
unnatural diet, thereby emotionally externalizing the cost 
of food, just like the industries do with the production 
cost . . . . 
Gabriela Steier, Externalities in Industrial Food Production: The Costs of 
Profit, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 163, at 171 (citing JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, 
EATING ANIMALS 8–9 (2009) (footnote omitted)). 
120 See Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 268. 
121 RONALD MCDONALD HOUSE CHARITIES, http://rmhc.org (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2012). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 35 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
disarms snack and fast food opponents faster.122 As a result, consumers trust 
Big Food's statements and continue to buy its products. 
By buying itself out of opposition, Big Food manages to stay under the 
blame radar for the obesity epidemic and public health consequences its 
business fuels. As long as the government allows Big Food to play by its 
book, the conflict of interest will continue to pervade the FDA and USDA's 
mission to protect consumers from detrimental promotions and eating habits 
advocated by the agribusinesses and fast food companies. Big Food's 
unfettered reign over the American public's health have devastating 
consequences for America's public health, the environment and democratic 
principles. 
II. RESULTS OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST—MORE PROBLEMS 
Health professionals of all levels are trained to believe in Big Food's 
propaganda and therefore fail to alert the public of the dangers associated 
with snack and fast foods. For example, Joseph Keon estimates that about 21 
million Americans have some form of cow-milk allergy, which amounts to 
7.5 percent of the population.123 Moreover, Harvard allergist, Dr. Stephen 
Astor "is convinced that a third of the population suffers from some form of 
food allergy."124 Nonetheless, many of these conditions remain undiagnosed 
because the food industry powerfully promotes its propaganda through the 
FDA and USDA in medical schools, hospitals, and beyond. Physicians, 
                                                        
122  Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 268–69 (internal citations 
omitted). 
123 KEON, supra note 58, at 37. 
124  Id. at 39–40 ("Food allergy symptoms include skin rash, hives, 
swelling, wheezing, congestion, diarrhea, constipation, vomiting, nausea, 
watery eyes, runny nose, buildup of mucus, earaches and ear infections, 
headaches, skin discoloration, joint swelling, asthma, ulcerative colitis, 
inability to focus, colic, chronic fatigue, swelling of the throat, intestinal 
bleeding . . . , and death.") (internal citations omitted). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 36 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
nutritionists, and other health care practitioners are indoctrinated by Big 
Food's campaigns, such as the food pyramid. 
Even the best medical or nutrition programs at some of America's most 
renowned universities buy into Big Food's scheme. For example, a nutrition 
course at the Tufts University School of Medicine recently promoted the 
2005 MyPyramid as a wholesome diet.125  Even the nutritionists at the 
neighboring Tufts University Friedman School of Nutrition Science and 
Policy, one of the nation's leading institutions on nutrition science have the 
MyPyramid on its website, and by association, show support of Big Food's 
propaganda. With such a public sign of support, professors may feel pressure 
to promote Big Food's campaign out of concern for losing their research 
grants and possibly their jobs. An assistant professor with a Ph.D. in nutrition 
at the Tufts School of Nutrition, who asked to remain anonymous, admitted: 
"I do think [food companies] play a role in the current obesity epidemic in a 
number of ways, including influencing policies that affect what ends up in the 
food supply."126  However, she refused to concede that a vegan diet, as 
advocated by Dr. Campell in The China Study and similar works,127 embodies 
wiser food choices than MyPyramid.128 
                                                        
125 Tufts University School of Medicine Nutrition Course Lecture Notes 
(2006/07) (on file with author). 
126  Interview with Anonymous, Assistant Professor, Tufts School of 
Nutrition (Feb. 11, 2012) (on file with author). 
127 See generally HARRIS, supra note 6; MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 
(2006). 
128 MyPyramid: Steps to a Healthier You, MYPYRAMID.GOV, Apr. 2005, 
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/food-groups/downloads/MiniPoster.pdf. 
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A. THE FOOD PYRAMID—IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFLICTED 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Figure 1 The 2005 Dietary Guidelines illustrate as a pyramid. 
On a broad cultural basis, the primary way in which the conflicted 
recommendations reach the public is via the food pyramid illustration of 
dietary guidelines.129 The two recent versions of the food pyramid, the 2005 
                                                        
129 A dietary pattern analysis provides the following insights: 
Dietary guidelines have been developed by many groups, 
including the World Health Organization, most national 
governments, and other organizations concerned with 
specific diseases such as cancer or heart disease. These 
guidelines are intended to provide education for the 
public about healthy food choices, and are also often 
used by governments for setting nutrition policies and by 
institutions in planning menus. Ideally, they would also 
guide agricultural and economic policies. These uses can 
reinforce each other and have an important effect on the 
health of a population; it is thus important that dietary 
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MyPyramid130 and the 2010 MyPlate,131 fail to make dietary recommendations 
that truly prevent disease; instead, they promote American agribusiness.132 
Every five years, the USDA and HHS together publish revised dietary 
guidelines for Americans, which "must be based on the preponderance of 
current scientific and medical knowledge, and they must be promoted by 
every federal agency when carrying out a food, nutrition or health 
program."133 Unfortunately, as explained in Part I (B) above, the science is 
not usually as sound as it should be under 7 U.S.C. § 5341 (Establishment of 
Dietary Guidelines) because Big Food manipulates the bases of the advisory 
committees recommendations. 
One of the main reasons for the great interest in the guidelines is the 
billions of dollars used to create them.134 The National School Lunch and 
Breakfast Programs, for example, have allotted funds based on these 
guidelines and distributed food to over 31 million children nationwide, in 
                                                                                                                              
guidelines be based on the best available evidence and 
that they be evaluated rigorously. As the goal of dietary 
guidelines is to promote better health, the most direct 
way to evaluate them is to determine whether adherence 
to the guidelines predicts better health. 
Walter C. Willett & Marjorie L. McCullough, Dietary Pattern Analysis for 
the Evaluation of Dietary Guidelines, 17 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 
75, 75 (2008). 
130 MyPyramid, supra note 128. 
131  CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV, www.choosemyplate.gov (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
132 See SIMON, supra note 24, at 144. 
133 Herman, supra note 4, at 286 (internal citations omitted). 
134 Id. 
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correspondence with the food pyramid.135 Additionally, schools participating 
in the School Lunch Program receive discounts, entitlements and bonuses 
from the USDA.136 Big Food thereby ensures not only that children grow used 
to and become dependent on its products, but it also maintains government 
contracts to kindle its continuous sales. 
The dietary advice illustrated by MyPyramid and MyPlate fails to do 
what it is supposedly designed for—preventing chronic disease and 
promoting healthy lifestyles.137  Big Food's interests are so thoroughly 
promoted by the government's dietary guidelines that they drown out public 
health concerns. As Part II (B) shows, diet-related diseases have likely been 
aggravated by the dietary recommendations for those who followed them 
loosely and "[i]f adhering to the Guidelines cannot prevent chronic diseases, 
then they fail at their most basic purpose."138 Thus, as Michele Simon notes, 
MyPyramid is "Our Problem,"139 because "[t]he very names MyPyramid tells 
us the government is placing all responsibility for good nutrition squarely 
with [consumers]. Never mind those pesky government subsidies and tax 
breaks to big agribusiness and food manufacturers that make unhealthy food 
so cheap and ubiquitous."140 
Part of Big Food's goal is to grant the government and its revolvers 
immunity through "MyPyramid's emphasis on activity [which] plays right 
into the food industry's hands"141 by allowing Big Food to "deflec[t] blame 
                                                        
135  National School Lunch Program Fact Sheet, USDA, Aug. 2012, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf. 
136 Id. 
137 Herman, supra note 4, at 288. 
138 Id. 
139 SIMON, supra note 24, at 146. 
140 Id. at 147. 
141 Id. 
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for incessantly promoting unhealthy products"142 and by "point[ing] to the 
nation's couch potato tendencies."143 Consequently, there is a complete failure 
to attribute blame to those who deserve it.144 
The 2005 dietary guidelines were outlined in "Steps to a Healthier 
You"145 in the shape of a pyramid, depicting a stick figure walking up the 
stairs (see Figure 1). This was the last of a series of pyramid-shaped 
illustrations of the dietary guidelines. Several problematic foods remain a part 
of the illustration and the funds by the food and beverage lobby correlate with 
those foods. Meat, for example, is heavily emphasized as a protein-rich food; 
only two vegetarian versions are shown, peanut butter and beans. This may 
be in part due to the $3,020,000 that the meat processing and products lobby 
invested in 2005.146 Under these circumstances, the food pyramid may reflect 
the food industry's interests rather than those of consumers. 
News channel NBC reported that on June 2, 2011, "First Lady Michelle 
Obama . . . unveiled the new healthy diet icon: A simple dinner plate, divided 
according to food group, meant to make it clear what and how much is 
healthy to eat."147  The 2010 illustration of a plate is no better than its 
pyramidal predecessor. One of the most disturbing "food groups" on this 
illustrated version of the dietary guidelines is the glass of milk on the side of 
the plate. 
                                                        
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 MyPyramid, supra note 128. 
146 Meat Processing and Products: Industry Profile, 2005, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/induscode.php?id  
=G2300&year=2005. 
147 Food Pyramid Dumped for 'My Plate' (MSNBC television broadcast 
June 6, 2011), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43253092/ns/ 
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Milk is big business for Big Food. Milk and dairy have always played an 
important role on the dietary guidelines and the science to prove how 
detrimental milk and dairy consumption truly has been swept under Big 
Food's rug.148 In 2010, when the recommendations for MyPlate were drafted, 
the dairy lobby collectively reported $5,595,885.00, 58 lobbyists and 31 
revolvers.149 One cannot help but wonder whether MyPlate also works as a 
pie chart representing the amount of money invested by food lobbies (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2 The 2010 Dietary Guidelines illustrated as a plate with a glass of milk. 
Joseph Keon explains that several advisory committee members directly 
received funds from the National Dairy Council, which is yet again proof 
"that the USDA's primary job is not to encourage healthful eating . . . but 
rather to promote American agricultural products."150 "One of every seven 
                                                                                                                              
health-diet_and_nutrition/t/food-pyramid-dumped-my-plate/#.T4LvhZp 
WrPQ. 
148 KEON, supra note 58, at 11. 
149 Dairy: Industry Profile, 2010, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=A04&year=2010. 
150 KEON, supra note 58, at 11. 
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grocery dollars purchases some form of cow's milk."151 In direct correlation 
with the increase in dairy consumption is the onset of several chronic food-
related illnesses. Thus, the dairy industry's advertisements and lobbying 
efforts directly impact what people eat and, correspondingly, how nutrition 
affects their health. 
B. BIG FOOD'S DAMAGE IS DONE—THE AMERICAN DIET AND 
OBESITY EPIDEMIC  
Dietary recommendations issued by the FDA and USDA in harmony 
with Big Food's propaganda have devastating consequences for public health. 
As long as the Food Pyramid's key message "eat less" is muted by the food 
industry's lobby power and control over consumer protection agencies, 
obesity rates will continue to rise and the American public will get sicker and 
sicker.152 "International scientists, who are less likely to be brainwashed by 
American Big Food propaganda than their American colleagues, report that 
consumption of foods high in saturated and industrially produced trans fats, 
salt, and sugar is the cause of at least 14 million deaths or 40% of all deaths 
every year from [non-communicable diseases]." 153  For example, over-
consumption of salt causes up to "30% of all cases of hypertension."154 
Despite Big Food's undermining of the scientific bases for the dietary 
                                                        
151 Id. at 9 ("According to the [USDA], the average American consumes 
approximately thirty ounces of milk, cheese, and butter a day—or six hundred 
pounds of dairy products a year"). 
152 See generally HARRIS, supra note 6, at 101. 
153 Non-communicable diseases include diabetes, cancer, heart disease, 
and obesity-related health complications. These diseases are also called 
chronic food-related illnesses. 
154 Robert Beaglehole et al., Health Policy, Priority Actions for the Non-
communicable Disease Crisis, 377 LANCET 1438, 1446 (2011) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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guidelines, it is well established that obesity can be fatal155 and that eating 
less could, in fact, save lives. The American Journal of Obesity reports that 
"Americans are gaining weight"156 and it is time for the dietary guidelines to 
recommend a true eat-less-response to America's increasingly sick 
consumers, thus Big Food's abuse of the dietary guidelines is fueling the 
damage to public health. 
Improving the dietary recommendations could reverse much of the 
damage that will be discussed in the subsequent subparts 1–3 to public health, 
the environment and America's democracy. In addition to reversing pollution 
and diseases, food governmentenomics could be changed from a Big Food-
oriented government where the food market-share has been privatized by the 
influence of food industrialists by the agribusinesses and snack and fast food 
companies, to significant savings of government funds and the promotion of 
public health. According to Binkley and Jekanowski, scientists who study 
obesity prevalence, it "is also a factor in the nation's burgeoning health care 
bill."157 Supporting public health could ultimately lead to decreased health 
care costs and improved and sustainable agriculture, which has led to 
increased profitability in several other nations, such as Finland, as discussed 
below. Taking the measures to stop Big Food from bullying the FDA and 
USDA into boosting the industry's profit could thus have wide-reaching 
benefits for the nation as a whole. 
Current USDA-issued dietary guidelines fail at their most basic 
purpose—preventing disease by promoting healthy nutrition.158 In fact, this 
                                                        
155  J.K. Binkley, J. Eales & M. Jekanowski, The Relation Between 
Dietary Change and Rising U.S. Obesity, 24 INTL. J. OBESITY 1032, 1032 
(2000). 
156 Id. at 1032. 
157 Id. 
158 Herman, supra note 4, at 291 (2010) ("The Guidelines underperform 
because they fail to distinguish between foods that prevent and cause 
disease"); Willett & McCullough, supra note 129, at 76 ("Dietary guidelines 
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failure is due to the arbitrary, industry-created values on which the USDA 
builds the guidelines. The Food Pyramid is a decision anchor for consumers, 
but it is set up to support the industry instead of public health.159 Big Food 
was only able to establish this arbitrary base value of allegedly healthy food 
choices through the conflict-of-interest loopholes. Consequently, unhealthy 
food choices, such as milk and meat,160 became distorted reference points for 
American consumers and were, nonetheless, embedded in the Food Pyramid. 
1. PUBLIC HEALTH 
Obesity has become an epidemic.161 The explosion of obesity rates can 
be linked to Big Food's actions because it pushes for policies that promote 
increased snack and fast food consumption and brainwash health practitioners 
so that they do not tell patients to stop eating junk food. According to Paul 
Rozin, cultural psychologist and associate director of the Solomon Asch 
Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Big Food's policies caused a "shift of many food risks from 
acute ([such as] food poisoning) to long term ([such as] links between diet 
                                                                                                                              
are generally designed to promote overall good health, which would include 
reducing the major causes of morbidity and mortality in a population."). 
159 See Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Coherent 
Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stables Preferences, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 73, 101 (2003) ("the effect of the arbitrary anchor shows that, while 
people are adjusting their valuations in a coherent, seemingly sensible, 
fashion to account for duration, they are doing so around an arbitrary base 
value"). 
160 See generally CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 311; KEON, 
supra note 58, at 10. 
161  The UN High-Level Meeting on Non-Communicable Diseases 
(NCDs) in September, 2011 called for immediate and long-term actions to 
combat the alarmingly explosive obesity epidemic, which is spiking to 
unprecedented highs in the U.S. See Beaglehole et al., supra note 155, at 
1447. 
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and heart disease or cancer)"162 because "there are mismatches between our 
biological predispositions and the new food environment that we have 
created."163 As Dr. Campbell explains in The China Study, this "disease of 
affluence"164 is directly linked to obesity, including various forms of cancer, 
heart disease, autoimmune diseases, and wide-ranging effects on bone, 
kidney, eye and brain diseases. The list of diet-related chronic diseases is 
very long.165 America's top three causes of death, heart disease, breast cancer, 
and prostate cancer, all correlate with the increased obesity epidemic caused 
by the incessant propaganda of American agribusinesses and food 
industrialists. 
The dietary guidelines fail to acknowledge how a diet rich in animal 
protein and high in fat could lead to obesity, and thus consumers continue to 
blindly follow Big Food's propaganda without being aware of the diet-related 
risks. Dr. Campell's extensive 30-year studies proved that the risk of cancer 
proliferation and diet-related diseases increase once a five percent threshold 
of dietary animal protein is surpassed.166 In other words, eating more than a 
combined total of five percent of meat, eggs, fish, and dairy, may trigger 
cancer growth. Even the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition is carefully 
                                                        
162 Paul Rozin, The Meaning of Food in Our Lives: A Cross-Cultural 
Perspective on Eating and Well-Being, 37 J. NUTRITION EDUC. BEHAV. 107, 
108 (2005). 
163 Id. 
164 See generally CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19. 
165  Diet-related autoimmune diseases include: Graves' disease 
(hyperthyroidism), rheumatoid arthritis, thyroiditis (hypothyroidism), vitiligo, 
pernicious anemia, glomerulonephritis, multiple sclerosis, type 2 diabetes, 
systemic lupus erythematosus, Sjogren's disease, myasthenia gravis, 
polymyositis/dermatomyositis, Addison's disease, scleroderma, primary 
bilary cirrhosis, uveitis, chronic active hepatitis, osteoporosis, acute renal 
colic, Parkinson's disease, and Alzheimer's disease. CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, 
supra note 19, at 184, 204, 211, 219–21. 
166 Id. at 120. 
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conceding that an increased amount of dairy correlates with breast cancer 
prevalence.167 About 1 million women die every year of breast cancer, 20 
percent of them in the United States. 168  A study published in 
Neuroepidemiology in 1992, demonstrates that milk consumption, in addition 
to a diet composed of high-fat animal protein, corresponds with the 
prevalence of multiple sclerosis.169 However, the USDA and FDA fail to 
acknowledge the correlation and milk is still featured as a separate allegedly 
irreplaceable food group on MyPlate.gov. Nonetheless, a change in dietary 
guidelines is urgently needed to stop the epidemic of obesity and diet-related 
diseases in the U.S.170 
Researchers and scientists who support the warnings of the obesity 
epidemic must be heard. At a symposium titled "Modifying the Food 
Environment: Energy Density, Food Costs, and Portion Size," scientists from 
the American Society for Nutritional Sciences blamed Big Food and the food 
environment it has created for the current obesity epidemic.171 Diet-related 
chronic diseases, such as obesity, cancer, heart disease, multiple sclerosis, 
                                                        
167  Patricia G. Moorman & Paul D. Terry, Consumption of Dairy 
Products and the Risk of Breast Cancer: a Review of Literature, 80 AM. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 5, 5 (2004). 
168 Id. 
169 D. Malosse, H. Perron, A. Sasco & J.M. Seigneurin, Correlation 
Between Milk and Dairy Product Consumption and Multiple Sclerosis 
Prevalence: A Worldwide Study, 11 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 4–6 (1992). 
170 Ahmed, supra note 2, at 565 (internal citations omitted). 
171  Symposium, Modifying the Food Environment: Energy Density, 
Food Costs, and Portion Size, American Society for Nutritional Sciences, 135 
J. NUTRITION 898, 898 (2005) ("The current food environment effectively 
promotes energy intakes, whereas the physical environment limits 
opportunities for energy expenditure. . . . agricultural policies, food supply 
trends, food distribution and marketing practices, and the eating environment 
are responsible for the current obesity epidemic.") (internal citations omitted). 
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asthma, lupus, and diabetes,172 pose "the greatest threat to global health in the 
21st century; they cause 70 percent of deaths in the United States."173 
Consumer protection agencies, such as the FDA and USDA, should warn the 
public of the threat of the obesity epidemic and its associated diseases. It is 
time for the FDA and USDA advisory committees to understand "the 
mechanisms by which whole grains and legumes might improve glycemic 
control [to] facilitate the formulation of more specific dietary 
recommendations aimed at reducing risk of developing diabetes as well as 
treating those who have diabetes, than is possible at present"174 and to revise 
                                                        
172 It is well-known that Type 2 Diabetes Melitus (T2DM) is associated 
with nutrition, but as long as the FDA and USDA do not prevent Big Food 
from adding the addictive substances to foods, from advertising unhealthy 
foods as good food choices, and from marketing their products incessantly, it 
is unlikely that the T2DM onset due to overnutrition will come to a stop. See 
B.J. Venn & J.I. Mann, Cereal Grains, Legumes & Diabetes, 58 EUR. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 1443, at 1451 (2004). "[T]here is little doubt that diets 
containing substantial intakes of whole grain foods, fruit, vegetables and 
legumes are associated with an improvement in insulin sensitivity and other 
indicators of carbohydrate metabolism including improved glycemic control 
in people with diabetes." (internal citations omitted). Id. 
173 Herman, supra note 4, at 285 (internal citations omitted). 
Heart disease is easily the world's deadliest disease. In 
2005, it killed 864,480 Americans, more than cancer, 
accidents, chronic lower respiratory disease, and 
diabetes, combined, and the costs of treating heart 
disease are a global financial burden. In 2004, cancer 
caused 13 percent of all deaths globally, killing 7.4 
million people, and it is the second leading cause of 
death in the United States. Id. 
174 The practices of stripping foods from nutrients to then enrich them 
and market them as healthy foods is dangerous and contributes to the T2DM 
onset. Venn & Mann, supra note 172, at 1444–51 ("[R]efining whole foods 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 48 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
the dietary guidelines accordingly. Moreover, federal laws must make these 
revisions possible. 
2. PRIVATIZING A HUMAN RIGHT AND INFRINGING UPON 
FREEDOM OF CHOICE 
While Big Food still depends on consumers' decisions to buy their food, 
food producers monopolize the market and eradicate consumers' free choice 
of what to eat.175 "Virtually all the chicken sold in America—more than 99 
percent, according to Bill Roenigk, vice president of the National Chicken 
Council—comes from factory-farm production similar to that used by Tyson 
Foods."176  Thus, American consumers support factory farming and irre-
sponsible farming practices with their purchases while also jeopardizing their 
own health because the industry monopolized the supply—and shapes the 
market through advertisements and government manipulation. The lobbyists 
have disarmed even the federal consumer protection agencies. Big Food-
sponsored research grants are steadily pounding away at any attempts to 
advance consumer protection. Furthermore, by suppressing free speech 
through food disparagement statutes, or veggie libel laws,177 and by coercing 
supermarkets into offering almost exclusively factory farmed eggs to limit 
consumers' alternatives to buy free range locally farmed eggs, for example, is 
a burden on democracy. The legislature must step in to protect consumer 
                                                                                                                              
may be implicated in the aetiology of T2DM stems from observations that the 
frequency of diabetes increased in populations as unprocessed or lightly 
processed foods were replaced by refined products.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
175 See generally NESTLE, supra note 127. 
176 PETER SINGER & JIM MASON, THE ETHICS OF WHAT WE EAT : WHY 
OUR FOOD CHOICES MATTER 21–22 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
177  Steier, supra note 119, at 185–86 ("These veggie libel laws are 
legislative products of the externalized costs of unsustainable food production 
practices."). 
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autonomy and the free flow of information for balanced and honest dietary 
guidelines.178 
III. SOLUTIONS 
As Big Food's propaganda became part of the dietary guidelines, the 
accompanying unsustainable food production practices and unethical 
behavior also became the norm in the food policy-making process. Lobbyists 
have spread misconceptions regarding the basis of a healthy diet for decades. 
The 2005 and 2010 dietary guidelines incorporate those false beliefs and fail 
to prevent diet-related diseases. In response to Big Food's manipulative 
practices, which started in the 1970's, the federal advisory committee 
members reacted with similarly unconscionable dietary guidelines whose 
"reaction depend[ed] on the social norms implied by the observed dishonesty 
and also on the saliency of dishonesty."179 Big Food's saliency is immense 
due to the food governmentenomics strategies it has been using for several 
decades.  
This part suggests ways to close these loopholes by reintroducing higher 
ethical standards, stricter requirements to qualify as advisory committee 
members, and unforgiving disclosure mandates. These proposals will allow 
health practitioners to evaluate the current arbitrary food recommendations 
and issue balanced and scientifically sound dietary guidelines in the future.180 
                                                        
178 Ahmed, supra note 2, at 566 ("Personal autonomy allows for rational 
and fully informed individuals to eat what they please, even if it is harmful. 
Food law supports the preservation of consumer autonomy and information in 
several ways."). 
179  Francesca Gino, Shahar Ayal & Dan Ariely, Contagion and 
Differentiation in Unethical Behavior, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 397 (2009). 
180 Willett & McCullough, supra note 129, at 77 ("Dietary Guidelines 
should be evaluated for their ability to predict the occurrence of major illness, 
and such analyses can help refine these guidelines."). 
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A. THE CURRENT LOOPHOLES—WHY THE LAWS ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT BIASED RECOMMENDATIONS 
Big Food abuses loopholes that result from overly specific and 
simultaneously incomplete federal statutes.181 For example, 7 U.S.C. § 5341 
assigns the establishment of dietary guidelines to the DHHS and the 
USDA,182 but leaves some of the control over food safety to the FDA.183 As a 
result of this fragmented food safety and nutrition agency design, there is no 
single government entity in charge to police the foods that are supposed to be 
evaluated for the dietary guidelines, which leaves much uncertainty as to who 
should enforce the agencies' responsibilities. It is likely that food industry 
lobbyists and revolvers further cause splits to fragment and destabilize these 
agencies to secure their control. Big Food abuses the resulting uncertainty for 
its own profit.184 According to Jeff Hermann, the law "tries to specify in great 
detail every type of prohibited conflict, and in so doing, it effectively permits 
all of those it fails to specify."185  Big Food takes advantage of these 
indeterminate loopholes. 
Current laws are insufficient to prevent Big Food's abuse of the 
loopholes associated with the establishment of dietary guidelines. According 
to Jeff Herman, there are four theoretical measures that could prevent Big 
Food's abuse of the loopholes: 
[1] mandatory confidential disclosures of interests, 
pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 
(EIGA); [2] the criminal prohibition of financial interests 
in 18 U.S.C. § 208; [3] ethical standards of conduct, 
                                                        
181 Herman, supra note 4, at 298. 
182 Id. 
183 See generally NEIL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2009). 
184 Id. at 305. 
185 Id. 
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pursuant to Executive Orders and regulations by the 
Office of Government Ethics (OGE); and [4] the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA).186 
None of these measures, however, effectively achieves the goals they are 
supposed to accomplish. The mandatory confidential disclosures under the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EIGA) are ineffective in preventing 
conflicts of interest among federal advisory committee members because "the 
minimal threat of public disclosure is not likely to dissuade many people"187 
and the ethical standards invoked barely apply to committee members who 
only serve for a short time in committees that change every five years. 
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 208 prohibits the advisory committee members from 
having "financial interests" in the guidelines. However, because "financial 
interests" are not defined, these prohibitions are rendered useless. Ethical 
sanctions under Executive Order 12,731 on the "Ethical Conduct for 
Government Officers and Employees"188  are not enforced, because "a 
violation would be virtually impossible to prove."189  Finally, the Federal 
                                                        
186 Herman, supra note 4, at 299. 
187 Id. at 300. 
188 Exec. Order No. 12731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42547 (Oct. 17, 1990). 
189 Herman, supra note 4, at 302. Jeff Herman further explains: 
So long as members support their recommendations with 
scientific evidence, it will appear they were motivated by 
their duty to the Committee and to science, not by a 
desire for personal or corporate gain. . . . [T]his standard 
cannot effectively prevent conflicts from influencing 
government action, as it actually permits the conflicted 
member to appear on the Committee; it only bars one 
particular manifestation of that conflict after his or her 
appointment. Instead, a preferable ethical standard would 
prevent individuals with conflicts from ever serving on 
the Committee. 
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Advisory Committee Act (FACA) is also imprecise and therefore subject to 
loopholes, rendering the legislation ineffective. Incomplete legislation fails to 
protect the government from Big Food's abuse. 
The most powerful solution to this problem is legislation to close the 
loopholes.190 In subsections 5(b)(2) and (3), FACA191 requires a fair balance 
of advisory committees but fails to specify how this fair balance may be 
achieved.192 Consequently, the federal advisory committees establishing the 
dietary guidelines pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 5341 consists of several food 
industry revolvers who taint the committee's objectivity in evaluating the 
scientific bases for the dietary guidelines. To stop transfers from Big Food to 
the federal agency advisory committees and to eliminate the potential for 
conflicts-of-interest, I first suggest an amendment to 7 U.S.C. § 5341 that 
establishes strict qualification requirements for federal advisory committee 
members that will advise the USDA and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) on dietary guidelines. These proposed amendments 
should preserve greater independence and objectivity in the committee. 
Second, disclosure requirements of prior affiliations for any advisory 
committee nominees, and requirements for balanced research are to be used 
as basis for the dietary recommendations as part of the requirements under 7 
U.S.C. § 5341. Third, amendments to the FACA that should enable the 
United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) to police the advisory 
committees for conflicts of interest. Finally, changes to 18 U.S.C. § 208 
eliminate some of the current loopholes that Big Food abuses. 
                                                                                                                              
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
190 Herman, supra note 4, at 285–86 ("Congress should make it more 
difficult for those with ties to the food and drug industries from serving on 
the Advisory Committee, as current laws are inadequate to do so. This 
requires a new prohibition of apparent conflicts of interest and some 
procedural safeguards."). 
191 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. APP. 2 §§ 1–16. 
192 Herman, supra note 4, at 303 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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B. RECREATING BALANCE OF INTERESTS THROUGH 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
1. COMPOSITION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES—
AMENDMENT TO 7 U.S.C. § 5341 
The specifications set forth in the proposed amendment are designed to 
create a committee of highly-qualified and impartial professionals so that the 
most important aspects of a healthy diet may be evaluated objectively. In 
order to ensure that the committee members remain unencumbered by the 
types of conflicts-of-interest described above, the qualification requirements 
include publications in peer-reviewed journals. Such requirements would tend 
to only qualify professionals who remain active within their fields and pursue 
alternative and creative approaches to preventive health care through 
nutrition. Six of the 15 committee members shall be physicians, three shall be 
other health care practitioners, two shall be agriculture and environmental 
scientists, and three shall be ethical and legal advisors. 
The group of physicians established in the suggested amendment in 7 
U.S.C. § 5341(a)(3) (see Appendix 1), include one of each of the following 
medical specialties: a general internist, a geriatrician, a pediatrician, an 
endocrinologist, a cardiologist, and a gastroenterologist. These professionals 
represent practitioners that treat the most common diet-related diseases, 
namely diseases that are related to the heart, the gastro-intestinal system, and 
to diabetes. Specialists for each respective field of medicine will serve on the 
committees to assure that the dietary guidelines do not aggravate risk factors 
that develop diet-related diseases while also helping to make dietary 
recommendations that prevent such diseases. 
Three of the six physicians on the advisory committee according to the 
proposed amendments are generalists who attend to preventative measures 
and nutrition needs of the main age groups. (A division of age groups could, 
for example, include infants, toddlers, school children, teenagers, young 
adults, adults, seniors.) While the general internist focuses the committee 
members' attention to health concerns of average consumers, such as the 
prevention and treatment of high cholesterol, hypertension, and diabetes, the 
geriatrician and pediatrician may focus on the specific recommendations that 
shall be adapted to the needs of the elderly population and to children to 
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prevent the same diseases. Moreover, children and the elderly population 
require higher and different amounts of vitamins, and the dietary guidelines 
should reflect their needs. Consequently, these three generalists will tailor the 
dietary recommendations to the needs of different age groups to prevent diet-
related diseases. 
The role of the endocrinologist on the advisory committee will be to 
customize the dietary recommendations to a low glycemic index, high fiber 
diet that prevents insulin resistency.193 The licensed endocrinologist on the 
committee shall also hold a Master of Science degree in nutrition or nutrition 
science. This additional qualification will assure that the endocrinologist 
serving on the committee has extensive expertise in nutrition therapy and 
preventive medicine to help the 22 million Americans with pre-diabetes, the 
precursor to type-2 diabetes,194 or with metabolic syndrome, the combination 
                                                        
193 For a discussion on the glycemic index, see NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT, 
supra note 198, at 313–15. For further discussion on the glycemic index as it 
relates to the suprametabolic syndrome, see MARK HYMAN, ULTRA-
METABOLISM 44–48 (2006). For a discussion on the correlation between diet 
and diabetes, see CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 145–55. 
194  The American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists (AACE) 
Legislative Fact Sheet supports the legislative and regulatory updates 
available on the AACE website, which show that the professional 
organization of endocrinologists actively lobbies for better diabetes 
awareness and care. Members of these organizations are likely to welcome 
the opportunity to participate in the revision of the dietary guidelines in line 
with the AACE's goal to treat and prevent diabetes. The American 
Association of Clinical Endocrinologists (AACE) Legislative Fact Sheet, THE 
AM. ASS'N OF CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGISTS, http://www.aace.com/files/ 
2011-Diabetes-Initiative-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2012); AACE 
Legislative and Regulatory Updates, THE AM. ASS'N OF CLINICAL 
ENDOCRINOLOGISTS, http://www.aace.com/advocacy/leg (last visited Apr. 23, 
2012). 
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of diabetes and heart disease risk factors due to obesity.195 
The licensed cardiologist will be able to provide the expertise necessary 
to draft the revised dietary guidelines with the goal of heart disease 
prevention in mind. The American College of Cardiology is already familiar 
with the FDA committee hearings and lobbying practices.196 Thus, a licensed 
clinical cardiologist and member of the American College of Cardiology may 
be able to anticipate where the dietary guidelines go astray and help steer the 
focus back to disease prevention through nutrition. Heart disease is one of the 
non-communicable diet-related diseases and causes 40% of deaths in 
America every year.197 A plant-based wholefoods diet can help to prevent the 
onset of these diseases and deaths.198 Cardiologists, such as Dr. Dean Ornish, 
founder and president of the Preventive Medicine Research Institute in 
Sausalito, California, and Clinical Professor of Medicine at the University of 
California, for example, drew attention to the importance diet has on heart 
disease.199 Dr. Caldwell B. Esselstyn, Jr. from The Cleveland Clinic in Ohio 
also suggests that heart disease can be prevented and reversed through a 
plant-based whole foods diet. 200  The cardiologist on the committee will 
                                                        
195 See FORTIN, supra note 183. 
196  The Am. Coll. of Cardiology, Food and Drug Administration, 
CARDIO SOURCE, http://www.cardiosource.org/Advocacy/Issues/Food-and-
Drug-Administration.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
197 CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 111–33. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. See also Dean Ornish, MD, PREVENTIVE MED. RESEARCH INST. 
(PMRI), http://www.pmri.org/dean_ornish.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
200  CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 111–33. See also 
CALDWELL B. ESSELSTYN JR., PREVENT AND REVERSE HEART DISEASE 
(2007). 
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collaborate with the other physicians on the committee to design heart-
healthy dietary guidelines.201 
The gastroenterologist, specializing in disorders and diseases of the 
gastrointestinal (GI) system,202  will provide expertise about the diseases 
affecting the GI system for the advisory committee. Many of the diseases 
within a gastroenterologist's expertise include diet-related diseases, such as 
inflammatory bowel disease, ulcerative colitis, Crohn's disease, celiac 
disease, colorectal cancers, stomach ulcers, irritable bowel syndrome, 
diverticulitis and many more. A greater understanding of these diseases will 
help the committee to fine-tune the dietary recommendations in order to 
decrease the risk to aggravate any of these disorders. 
Apart from the six physicians, a clinical nutritionist and physiologist 
shall also serve on the committee. While the nutritionist has a comprehensive 
understanding of the practical aspects of human nutrition, the physiologist has 
expertise in the metabolism of nutrients. Together with the physicians, these 
experts can focus on preventive and remedial nutrition therapy, the practical 
aspects of what people like and can afford to eat, as well as how the nutrients 
are absorbed. Such a comprehensive and thorough analysis will allow the 
advisory committee to issue specific and balanced dietary guidelines. 
To assure that the dietary recommendations are customized to the needs 
of consumers who take prescription medications, a pharmacist shall also 
serve on the advisory committee. A pharmacist is specially trained to 
understand the interactions between drugs and certain nutrients, such as 
alcohol and antibiotics, and will help the other committee members 
                                                        
201  The term "heart-healthy" was coined by various advertisement 
campaigns, such as the heart-healthy labels on cereals. See Topics—Heart 
Health, CHEERIOS, http://www.cheerios.com/Topics/Heart-Health#?p=2&c= 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2012); see generally NESTLE, supra note 6, at 39–40. 
202 The gastrointestinal system, from the mouth to the entire alimentary 
canal, comprises the upper and lower human GI tracts and the organs 
involved in the digestive process, such as the stomach and the gall bladder. 
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understand the complexity of physiological interactions of foods and drugs on 
the human body. Where the pharmacist's expertise overlaps with those of the 
cardiologist and endocrinologist, the other members will become especially 
important in evaluating the best dietary recommendations for the general 
public and specific target groups, such as children and the elderly. The 
pharmacist's input is crucial to the composition of a balanced advisory 
committee because the elderly population and people at risk of heart disease 
or diabetes often take a wide range of medication. 
Due to the impact that the dietary recommendations will have on public 
health and the environment, an agricultural scientist and an environmental 
scientist shall also be part of the committee. Because the availability of food 
greatly depends on agribusinesses, an agricultural scientist will serve on the 
advisory committee to help the other members to understand the interplay of 
the food supply, agricultural systems, and available foods. Examples of such 
advice may extend from veterinary science about the food animals, to 
agronomy,203 to plants for human consumption. The agricultural scientist will 
be able to explain the risk factors of pesticides and food processing, including 
food packaging. This information will help the other advisory committee 
members tailor their recommendations to the realities of the American food 
supply. 
The environmental scientists will be charged with predicting the 
sustainability of the food production for the foods that will be included in the 
dietary recommendations, so that the recommendations will not cause 
unwarranted depletion of the planet's resources or pollute the environment 
unnecessarily. Conversely, environmental science includes certain aspects of 
ecology, biology, edaphology,204  (soil science) and atmospheric science, 
                                                        
203  Agronomy is "a branch of agriculture dealing with field-crop 
production and soil management." Agronomy Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/agronomy. 
204  Edaphology is the science of soil composition, development, 
management, and cultivation. 
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which are all greatly affected by the food production system and agriculture. 
The environmental scientist will thus be able to evaluate the dietary 
recommendations in terms of sustainability, pollution, and general 
environmental factors. 
The environmental and public health impact of the American food 
production extends beyond the U.S., making the obesity epidemic is of global 
concern.205 Therefore, a member of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization206 shall also serve on the committee to assure that the American 
recommendations will not negatively impact the rest of the world.207 This 
member of the task force will combat the obesity epidemic and the global 
initiative against non-communicable diseases. 
To assist the committee in negotiations, an administrative lawyer and an 
ethics advisor on the committee shall also serve on the committee. These 
professionals will further help the committee to understand the scope of the 
ultimate USDA-issued guidelines, ethical obligations, and the consequences 
of the dietary recommendations. The lawyer will also help in negotiations 
between the advisory committee members and help in the drafting of the 
recommendations. Finally, the ethical advisor will overlook the 
recommendations for ecologic issues and the humane treatment of food 
animals, as well as the adaptability of the food recommendations for various 
cultural religious groups with dietary restrictions. Including ethical advisors 
in food policy committees follows the model of the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA),208 the Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA),209 
                                                        
205 See Beaglehole et al., supra note 154, at 1438–47. 
206 See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http:// 
www.fao.org. 
207  See generally VANDANA SHIVA, EARTH DEMOCRACY: JUSTICE, 
SUSTAINABILITY, AND PEACE (2005); VANDANA SHIVA, STOLEN HARVEST: 
THE HIJACKING OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY (2000). 
208 See generally EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY (EFSA), http:// 
www.efsa.europa.eu/. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 59 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.40 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
and the World Health Organization (WHO), 210  all of which have ethics 
delegates to assure sound decision making. The combination of these 
different professionals will converge in the composition of a well-balanced, 
independent, and objective advisory committee making recommendations for 
dietary guidelines. 
2. BALANCED RESEARCH BASES FOR DIETARY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sound scientific bases are vital for balanced dietary recommendations 
and comprise the building blocks for, and the tools of, the advisory 
committee members.211 However, the current version of 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(2) 
fails to define "balanced and sound research." Therefore, I propose the 
following amendment to mandate a three-pronged division of research 
materials for the use of the advisory committees issuing dietary 
recommendations to specify what "sound research" is: 
The committee issuing the information and guidelines 
shall use as a basis for the scientific and medical 
knowledge at most one third of each of the following 
combined or separate groups: 
(i) of industry, corporate, or otherwise privately funded 
sources, reports, studies, or data; 
(ii) of university-funded and university-conducted 
research, reports, studies, or data; and 
                                                                                                                              
209  See generally Ethics Links, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN POLICY 
ADVISORS (BEPA), http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/ethics-
links/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2012). 
210 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), ETHICS AND 
HEALTH, http://www.who.int/ethics/en/index.html. 
211 7 U.S.C. § 5341(a)(2) (2012). 
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(iii) of independent clinical data, reports, studies, or data 
from institutions or individuals that have no financial or 
professional interest in any industry, corporation, or 
other private party under subsection (a)(2)(i);212 
The resulting separation of scientific sources will prevent Big Food from 
tampering with the research and will force the advisory committee members 
to consult a wider range of studies and reports. If the three categories overlap, 
"[p]eriodical evaluations of the committee's compliance . . . shall be 
conducted by the United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE)"213 to 
ensure compliance with the objective and balanced principles underlying 
these provisions. Dr. Harris explains that looking at the way foods have been 
sorted by nutrient-to-weight ratios distorts the understanding of nutrition 
density in foods.214 Without these distortions, or by looking at the nutrient 
density ratios of certain foods, green leafy vegetables and nuts prove to be 
much more nutritiously valuable than any of the snack and fast foods or the 
dairy and meat choices, which the current dietary guidelines showcase. By 
rebalancing the research to evaluate foods for the dietary recommendations, 
the advisory committee members will, hopefully, rediscover alternative ways 
to analyze the available data to reach scientifically sound and complete bases 
for the revised dietary guidelines. Part of this balance would be the correct 
interpretation of nutrient-to-weight and nutrient-to-calorie ratios that Big 
Food's propaganda has distorted for the past three decades.215 
The advisory committee's minutes and research materials are public 
records, it is therefore important to allow a variety of sources to be included 
in the discussions surrounding the dietary recommendations. The mandated 
combinations of industry and corporate or otherwise privately-funded 
sources, university-funded and university-conducted research, and 
                                                        
212 Infra Appendix 1. 
213 Id. 
214 HARRIS, supra note 6, at 92–97. 
215 Id. 
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independent clinical data, reports, studies, or data from institutions or 
individuals that have no financial or professional interest in any industry, 
corporation, or other private party will provide the advisory committee 
members with a broad array of sources for objective evaluation. The proposed 
amendment to 7 U.S.C § 5341(b)(1) sets forth the documents that shall 
become part of the public record which will be disclosed along with the 
advisory committee meeting minutes (see Appendix 1). As a result of the 
detailed statutorily required report, the public record supporting the dietary 
recommendations will provide the basis and justifications for the 
recommendations, which may serve as public education tools and check on 
the impartiality of the committee at the same time. Therefore, subsection IV 
specifically mentions the national data for diet-related diseases and obesity. 
Contextualizing the recommendations with their immediate disease-
prevention objectives will, potentially dissuade corruption of the 
recommendations. 
3. BEYOND DISCLOSURE PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT—
ELIMINATING WAIVERS 
Another proposal to eliminate as much risk of corruption of the advisory 
committee as possible is the extensive disclosure requirements for nominees 
of committee members. In an ideal world, committee nominees would 
disclose their industry ties to prove that they are not revolvers and that no 
conflict of interest would exist if they were appointed to the committee. In 
reality, however, the government allows revolvers to hide in loopholes 
because revolvers help increase government funding.216 Therefore, disclosure 
requirements are insufficient and rigorous qualification criteria must be 
established for advisory committee members in an effort to exclude those 
scientists and physicians who are conflicted by setting the threshold of 
academics rather high (see Appendix 1). 
Instead of requiring mere disclosure, an amendment to the FACA 
§ 2(b)(3)(4) to create a rebuttable presumption that every nominee for the 
                                                        
216 HARRIS, supra note 6, at 105. 
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federal advisory committees has a conflict of interest, so that the nominee 
must rebut the presumption and prove his impartiality. Such a waiver of the 
conflict of interest will only be possible under two strict conditions: 
[I]f (i) at a hearing before the United States Office of 
Government Ethics, the employee can rebut the 
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
financial interest disclosed under subpart (b)(1) does not 
cause a conflict of interest; and 
(ii) a panel of at least five members of the United States 
Office of Government Ethics conclusively determines 
that no conflict of interest exists.217 
The proposed amendment thus empowers the OGE to police advisory 
committees and terminate them if the OGE finds that "one or more members 
of the advisory committee [act] in contravention of their fiduciary duties to 
the public."218 In addition, the OGE will periodically review the advisory 
committees' operations to ensure compliance with the rules set forth in the 
applicable statutes.219 This process is in line with the fundamental American 
government principles of checks and balances and separation of powers. 
Thus, assuming a conflict of interest exists will prevent revolvers from hiding 
in the loopholes created by overly specific and imperfect statutes, unless 
proven otherwise. An amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 208 in line with the 
proposed additions to the FACA § 2(b)(3)(4) shall further deter revolvers 
from serving on advisory committees. 
The rebuttable presumption that a conflict exists was necessitated by the 
failure of mere disclosure requirements in deterring revolvers from corrupting 
government agencies. The landmark case of Physicians Comm. for 
Responsible Med. v. Glickman, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000), where the 
                                                        
217 See amended 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) in Appendix 2. 
218 See amended 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2(b)(3) in Appendix 2. 
219 See amended 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2(b)(4) in Appendix 2. 
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plaintiff, Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, sought USDA 
disclosure of the materials used by an advisory committee proves that mere 
disclosure is insufficient in deterring revolvers from corrupting the 
recommendations. The FACA and, by association the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) under 5 U.S.C. § 552 failed to prevent revolvers 
from abusing the loopholes. Further proof for this failure is the decade of 
revolver activities and lobbying rates since Physicians Comm. for 
Responsible Med. v. Glickman was decided. Disclosure is mandatory 
according to the United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia 
Circuit220 but it remains largely ineffective. 
Mere disclosure of potential conflicts of interest is not enough to prevent 
corruption of the advisory committees, it is important to appoint only 
members with no ties to the industry. In an interview, Michele Simon 
explained that experts should have 
ZERO ties to industry. That's near impossible these days 
but so be it. In my view no expert that's taking money 
from the food industry should serve on an advisory 
committee, period. End of story. Disclosure is not 
sufficient, we know about the ties now, so that hardly 
helps.221 
Correspondingly, screening procedures have been implemented, but have 
failed in their attempts to stop revolvers from spreading Big Food's 
propaganda at the FDA and USDA. Even FDA attorney Cooper conceded 
that "[i]f an individual FDA employee could not exercise self-restraint on 
such matters of [conflicts of interests], he or she does not belong at the 
                                                        
220 Food Chem. News v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 980 F.2d 
1469, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that "an agency is generally obligated 
to make available for public inspection and copying all documents that are 
made available to or prepared for or by an advisory committee"). 
221 E-mail from Michele Simon (Apr. 5, 2012) (on file with author). 
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FDA—or elsewhere in the Government."222 Though the nature and intent of 
all nominees must be disclosed without exceptions so that the general public 
has complete information disclosure, such disclosure requirements have 
remained fruitless to-date. Daniel Meron, who suggested complete disclosure 
of DHHS members at his address at the 50th FDLI/FDA Annual Educational 
Conference on April 12, 2007, 223  explains that "U.S. law is focused on 
current interests and relationships and fails to adequately recognize that a 
person's past can create conflicts of interest just as likely to corrupt official 
actions."224 Consequently, advisory committee selection criteria have to go 
beyond mere conflict of interest screening processes. 
4. PROOF THAT IT WORKS: FINLAND'S ROLE MODEL 
American consumers are susceptible to Big Food's propaganda is the 
fact that there is no traditional American diet. Implementing a healthier diet is 
significantly more difficult in the United States, compared to other countries, 
such as Greece, where the Mediterranean diet is imbedded in the country's 
culture. Nevertheless, according to Jeff Herman, "that is an obstacle to better 
health that can be overcome."225 He explains that "Finland has set an example 
for the rest of the world" by changing the national diet and thereby improving 
public health.226 Although Finnish men had the highest mortality rate world-
wide and the average life expectancy was extremely low in both men and 
women, the Finnish government corrected these numbers around within 
twenty years.227 Through collaboration with the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the Finnish government "[got] people to smoke less, exercise more, 
                                                        
222 Cooper, supra note 34, at 802. 
223 Daniel Meron, Legal Developments Relevant to FDA Authority, 62 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441, 444 (2007). 
224 Id. 
225 Herman, supra note 4, at 293 (internal citations omitted). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
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eat more fruits and vegetables, and eat less salt and saturated fat, especially 
from dairy sources."228 As a result, Herman reports that "the mortality rate 
from heart disease fell 62.4 percent, and the mortality rate from cancer fell 
39.9 percent"229 for men. Conversely, for women, "the mortality rate from 
heart disease fell 65.9 percent, and the mortality rate from cancer fell 15.6 
percent."230 The "life expectancy for men rose 6.4 years, from 66.4 to 72.8, 
and life expectancy for women rose 5.6 years, from 74.6 to 80.2."231 These 
statistics provide encouraging and compelling reasons for the U.S. 
government to follow in Finland's footsteps and to change its dietary 
guidelines. Closing the loopholes and rebalancing the federal advisory 
committees in the U.S. to revise the dietary guidelines would be a significant 
first step. 
Even though legislative action may be a slow method of correction, 
Finland's model supports the theory that government-sponsored public 
education campaigns can be a powerful tool to bring about positive changes 
in the meantime. Theoretically, as Herman correctly notes, "the food industry 
still has a chance to work with the public health community, professional 
organizations, and governmental organizations—both national and 
international—in a manner that promotes, not combats, public health."232 For 
example, in order to prevent agribusinesses from foreclosure due to decreased 
sales in response to the public education campaign, the Finnish government 
helped former dairy farmers to switch to berry farming.233  This example 
illustrates how public education campaigns can motivate consumers to 
change the demand in the food market, which will eventually encourage the 
food industry to make promising changes, such as switching dairy farmers to 
                                                        
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Herman, supra note 4, at 293 (internal citations omitted). 
231 Id. 
232 Brownell & Warner, supra note 8, at 277. 
233 Id. 
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berry farming. In doing so, the supply of nutritionally-deficient hormone-
spiked milk in Finland was replaced by vitamin- and antioxidant-rich berries, 
which, in turn, became more widely available and were consumed more. The 
resulting benefits for public health decreased disease and mortality rates and 
surely lowered public health care costs. Food governmentenomics 
transformed from a vicious to a virtuous cycle promoting health and 
wholesome nutrition. 
Public education campaigns have yielded no results in the U.S. as a 
result of Big Food's stifling reactions. In the United States, "more emphasis 
on awareness of the consequences of obesity is needed, for, until consumers 
have the determination to make required lifestyle adjustments, knowledge of 
the causes is likely to be of little avail."234 Once American eaters begin to 
vote with their carts and choose healthier foods, both Congress and 
eventually the food industry may reshape the market in response to demand. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed amendments to FACA, 7 U.S.C. § 5341, and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 208, as well as the composition of the federal advisory committees will 
effect profound change on dietary recommendations as well as their 
underlying research basis. In addition, the proposed amendments will 
eradicate ineffective disclosure requirements and eliminate the possibility to 
waive conflicts of interest for advisory committee members. These 
amendments would also improve the nutrition-related risks of heart disease, 
cancer, and other non-communicable diseases. They will allow American 
consumers to recognize and choose more wholesome and healthy diets. 
Consumer choices will then reshape the demand of the food market and, thus, 
force agribusinesses and Big Food to adapt to a more sustainable and 
environmentally friendly food production. Implicit in the ability to make 
better food selections is the ability to reclaim the fundamental freedom of 
choice—placing Americans' health within their own hands instead of those of 
the Big Food industry. 
                                                        
234 Binkley, Eales & Jekanowski, supra note 155, at 1037. 
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However, fear of lost profits may cause these amendments to be 
suffocated by Big Food lobbyists and revolvers before the bill even reaches 
the legislature. Yet, if the end results (restructuring the food supply to extend 
the life spans of American consumers) were realized by lobbyists, they would 
also understand that their role in improving public health could increase their 
client base while remaining a major player in the food industry. Simply 
removing the unhealthy foods and replacing them with wholesome products 
from sustainable farming could boost profits by creating product 
diversification and by maintaining a healthier client base. 
Realigning the composition of the advisory committees and the 
scientific bases for the dietary recommendations will eliminate potential 
conflicts of interest. Granting waivers to federal advisory committee 
members introduces the ability to police these committees and prevent 
government officials from breaching their fiduciary duties to American 
consumers. Once established by the food industry, the concept of independent 
and objective committees should spread through the entire executive branch. 
Once the independent committees are introduced, they will be more likely to 
make independent and critical decisions for the public good rather than for 
the private sector. Ultimately, the removal of the conflicts of interest creates a 
standard for all executive committees and allows the government to function 
according to Abraham Lincoln's original principle, "government of the 
people, by the people, for the people" instead of, "government by Big Food 
for Big Food."  
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APPENDIX 1 
United States Code Annotated 
 Title 7. Agriculture 
 Chapter 84. National Nutrition Monitoring and Related 
Research 
   Subchapter III. Dietary Guidance 
7 U.S.C. § 5341 ESTABLISHMENT OF DIETARY GUIDELINES 
(a) Report 
(1) In general 
At least every five years the Secretaries shall publish a report entitled 
"Dietary Guidelines for Americans." Each such report shall contain 
nutritional and dietary information and guidelines for the general public, 
and shall be promoted by each Federal agency in carrying out any 
Federal food, nutrition, or health program. 
(2) Basis of guidelines 
The information and guidelines contained in each report required under 
paragraph (1) shall be based on the preponderance of the scientific and 
medical knowledge which is current at the time the report is prepared. 
Periodical evaluations of the committee's compliance with the following 
division of research materials shall be conducted by the United States 
Office of Government Ethics (OGE). The committee issuing the 
information and guidelines shall use as a basis for the scientific and 
medical knowledge at most one third of each of the following combined 
or separate groups: 
(i) of industry, corporate, or otherwise privately funded sources, reports, 
studies, or data; 
(ii) of university-funded and university-conducted research, reports, 
studies, or data; and 
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(iii) of independent clinical data, reports, studies, or data from 
institutions or individuals that have no financial or professional 
interest in any industry, corporation, or other private party under 
subsection (a)(2)(i); 
(3) The members of the federal advisory committee on dietary guidelines 
shall be composed of the following fifteen members: 
(a) One General Internist, who, for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in 
the U.S. by the American Board of Medical Specialties in internal 
medicine, and who has published at least five medical papers about 
nutrition science or nutrition therapy in peer-reviewed medical 
journals; 
(b) One Geriatrician, who, for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in 
the U.S. by the American Board of Medical Specialties in 
geriatrics; 
(c) One Pediatrician, for the purpose of this statute, shall be defined as 
a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in the U.S. 
by the American Board of Medical Specialties in pediatrics, and 
who has published at least five medical papers about nutrition 
science or nutrition therapy in peer-reviewed medical journals 
specifically relating to the nutrition of children and adolescents; 
(d) One Endocrinologist, for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in 
the U.S. by the American Board of Medical Specialties in 
endocrinology, and who holds a Master of Science degree from an 
accredited university in the U.S. in nutrition; 
(e) One Cardiologist, for the purpose of this statute, shall be defined as 
a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in the U.S. 
by the American Board of Medical Specialties in cardiology; and 
who has published at least five medical papers about nutrition 
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science or nutrition therapy as they relate to heart-health in peer-
reviewed medical journals; 
(f) One Gastroenterologist, for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed physician specialized in and board certified in 
the U.S. by the American Board of Medical Specialties in 
gastroenterology, and who has published at least five medical 
papers about nutrition science or nutrition therapy relating to diet-
related diseases or food allergies in peer-reviewed medical 
journals; 
(g) One Nutritionist, who for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed nutritionist holding a Master of Science 
degree and a Ph.D. in nutrition or nutrition science from an 
accredited university in the U.S., and who has published at least 
five medical papers about nutrition science or nutrition therapy 
relating to diet-related diseases in peer-reviewed medical journals; 
(h) One Pharmacist, who for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a licensed pharmacist holding a Master of Science 
degree and a Ph.D. in nutrition or nutrition science from an 
accredited university in the U.S., and who has published at least 
five medical papers about the interactions of food and medicine in 
peer-reviewed journals; 
(i) One Agricultural Scientist, who for the purpose of this statute, shall 
be defined as a person holding a Master of Science degree and 
Ph.D. in agricultural science or agronomy from an accredited 
university in the U.S., and who has published at least five articles 
or papers relating to agriculture in peer-reviewed journals, and who 
can demonstrate a comprehensive understanding in biosafety and 
sustainable agriculture; 
(j) One Environmental Scientist, who for the purpose of this statute, 
shall be defined as a person holding a Master of Science degree and 
Ph.D. in environmental science or ecology from an accredited 
university in the U.S., and who has published at least five articles 
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or papers relating to agriculture and food production in peer-
reviewed journals; 
(k) One Physiologist, who for the purpose of this statute, shall be 
defined as a person holding a Master of Science degree and Ph.D. 
in biology from an accredited university in the U.S., and who has 
published at least five articles or papers relating to human 
physiology; 
(l) One Administrative Lawyer, who for the purpose of this statute 
shall be defined as a person holding a J.D. from an accredited law 
school in the U.S. licensed to practice law by the American Bar 
Association, and who is specialized in the branch of public law 
specifically related to administrative law, regulatory law, or 
legislation, and who has published at least five articles in law 
reviews, law journals, or other scholarly journals focusing on legal 
issues related to consumer protection, products liability, torts, or 
food law; 
(m) One representative from the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), who for the purpose of this statute shall 
be defined as a person who is listed by the United Nations as a task 
force secretary; and 
(n) One Ethical Advisor to the federal advisory committee, who for the 
purpose of this statute shall be defined as a person holding a Master 
of Arts degree and a Ph.D. in philosophy or ethics specialized in 
applied ethics as it relates to food or animal law; 
(b) Approval by Secretaries 
(1) Review 
Any Federal agency that proposes to issue any dietary guidance for the 
general population or identified population subgroups shall submit the 
text of such guidance to the Secretaries for a sixty-day review period 
and the federal advisory committee issuing the dietary guidance shall 
include with the dietary guidance 
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(i) detailed explanations and justifications for each recommendation 
issued; 
(ii) one set of projections for disease prevention and health promotion 
that the recommendation in (b)(1)(i) supports; 
(iii) a report and data sets for diet-related diseases nation-wide of the 
past year of the population's general and specific adherence to the 
previously issued guidelines; and 
(iv) national data for rates of and deaths due to obesity, cancer, heart 
disease, diabetes, autoimmune disorders, and allergy rates 
assessments projected to result from the population's adherence to 
the guidelines; 
(2) Basis of review 
(A) In general 
During the sixty-day review period established in paragraph (1), the 
Secretaries shall review and approve or disapprove such guidance to 
assure that the guidance either is consistent with the "Dietary Guidelines 
for Americans" or that the guidance is based on medical or new 
scientific knowledge which is determined to be valid by the Secretaries. 
If after such sixty-day period neither Secretary notifies the proposing 
agency that such guidance has been disapproved, then such guidance 
may be issued by the agency. If both Secretaries disapprove of such 
guidance, it shall be returned to the agency. If either Secretary finds that 
such guidance is inconsistent with the "Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans" and so notifies the proposing agency, such agency shall 
follow the procedures set forth in this subsection before disseminating 
such proposal to the public in final form. If after such sixty-day period, 
either Secretary disapproves such guidance as inconsistent with the 
"Dietary Guidelines for Americans" the proposing agency shall— 
(i) publish a notice in the Federal Register of the availability of the 
full text of the proposal and the preamble of such proposal which 
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shall explain the basis and purpose for the proposed dietary 
guidance; 
(ii) provide in such notice for a public comment period of thirty 
days; and 
(iii) make available for public inspection and copying during 
normal business hours any comment received by the agency during 
such comment period. 
(B) Review of comments 
After review of comments received during the comment period either 
Secretary may approve for dissemination by the proposing agency a 
final version of such dietary guidance along with an explanation of the 
basis and purpose for the final guidance which addresses significant and 
substantive comments as determined by the proposing agency. 
(C) Announcement 
Any such final dietary guidance to be disseminated under subparagraph 
(B) shall be announced in a notice published in the Federal Register, 
before public dissemination along with an address where copies may be 
obtained. 
(D) Notification of disapproval 
If after the thirty-day period for comment as provided under 
subparagraph (A)(ii), both Secretaries disapprove a proposed dietary 
guidance, the Secretaries shall notify the Federal agency submitting such 
guidance of such disapproval, and such guidance may not be issued, 
except as provided in subparagraph (E). 
(E) Review of disapproval 
If a proposed dietary guidance is disapproved by both Secretaries under 
subparagraph (D), the Federal agency proposing such guidance may, 
within fifteen days after receiving notification of such disapproval under 
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subparagraph (D), request the Secretaries to review such disapproval. 
Within fifteen days after receiving a request for such a review, the 
Secretaries shall conduct such review. If, pursuant to such review, either 
Secretary approves such proposed dietary guidance, such guidance may 
be issued by the Federal agency. 
(3) Limitation on definition of guidance 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "dietary guidance for the 
general population" does not include any rule or regulation issued by a 
Federal agency. 
(4) "Identified population subgroups" defined 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "identified population 
subgroups" shall include, but not be limited to, groups based on factors 
such as age, sex, or race. 
(c) Existing authority not affected 
This section does not place any limitations on— 
(1) the conduct or support of any scientific or medical research by any 
Federal agency; 
(2) the presentation of any scientific or medical findings or the exchange 
or review of scientific or medical information by any Federal agency; or 
(3) the authority of the Food and Drug Administration under the 
provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 301 et seq.]. . . .  
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APPENDIX 2 
United States Code Annotated 
 Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure 
  Part I. Crimes 
   Chapter 11. Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest 
18 U.S.C. § 208 ACTS AFFECTING A PERSONAL FINANCIAL INTEREST 
(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or 
employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or of any 
independent agency of the United States, a Federal Reserve bank director, 
officer, or employee, or an officer or employee of the District of Columbia, 
including a special Government employee, participates personally and 
substantially as a Government officer or employee, through decision, 
approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, 
investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other proceeding, application, 
request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, 
charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which, to his 
knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, general partner, organization in 
which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee, 
or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any 
arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest—
Shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of this title. 
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply— 
(1) if the officer or employee first advises the Government official 
responsible for appointment to his or her position of the nature and 
circumstances of the judicial or other proceeding, application, request 
for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, 
accusation, arrest, or other particular matter and makes full disclosure of 
the financial interest and receives in advance a written determination 
made by such official that the interest is not so substantial as to be 
deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services which the 
Government may expect from such officer or employee, if 
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 (i) at a hearing before the United States Office of Government 
Ethics, the employee can rebut the presumption by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the financial interest disclosed under subpart (b)(1) 
does not cause a conflict of interest; and 
 (ii) a panel of at least five members of the United States Office of 
Government Ethics conclusively determines that no conflict of interest 
exists; 
(2) if, by regulation issued by the Director of the Office of Government 
Ethics, applicable to all or a portion of all officers and employees 
covered by this section, and published in the Federal Register, the 
financial interest has been exempted from the requirements of 
subsection (a) as being too remote or too inconsequential to affect the 
integrity of the services of the Government officers or employees to 
which such regulation applies; or 
(3) in the case of a special Government employee serving on an advisory 
committee within the meaning of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(including an individual being considered for an appointment to such a 
position), the official responsible for the employee's appointment, after 
review of the financial disclosure report filed by the individual pursuant 
to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, certifies in writing that the 
need for the individual's services outweighs the potential for a conflict of 
interest created by the financial interest involved; or 
(4) (3) if the financial interest that would be affected by the particular 
matter involved is that resulting solely from the interest of the officer or 
employee, or his or her spouse or minor child, in birthrights— 
(A) in an Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 
community, including any Alaska Native village corporation as 
defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, which is recognized as eligible for the special 
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians 
because of their status as Indians, 
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(B) in an Indian allotment the title to which is held in trust by the 
United States or which is inalienable by the allottee without the 
consent of the United States, or 
(C) in an Indian claims fund held in trust or administered by the 
United States, if the particular matter does not involve the Indian 
allotment or claims fund or the Indian tribe, band, nation, organized 
group or community, or Alaska Native village corporation as a 
specific party or parties. 
(c) . . . .(unaltered) 
 
